References: Country Profiles

25. Authors’ interviews with D, a Kuwaiti subject matter expert, online, 15 September 2021, F, a Kuwaiti subject matter expert, online, 14 October 2021, and G, a Kuwaiti government official, online, 25 October 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. Amnah Ibraheem, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 3: The View from Bahrain and Kuwait’, podcast audio, 24 February 2022, https://rusi.org/podcasts/mind-the-gulf/episode-3-view-bahrain-and-kuwait.

26. Authors’ interviews with D, F and G. For further details on the linkages between religion and nationalism in Iran, see Meir Litvak, ‘”God’s Favoured Nation”: The New Religious Nationalism in Iran’, Religions (Vol. 11, No. 10, 2020), pp. 541-560; Meir Litvak (editor), Constructing Nationalism in Iran: From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic (London: Routledge, 2017); Ali M. Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Menahem Merhavy, National Symbols in Modern Iran: Identity, Ethnicity, and Collective Memory (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2019).

27. Authors’ interviews with D, F and G.

28. Authors’ interviews with E, a Kuwaiti subject matter expert, online, 27 September 2021. For further information on the difficulties of negotiating with non-state armed actors, see Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘How to Engage Armed Groups? Reviewing Options and Strategies for Third Parties’, Sicherheit Und Frieden (S+F)/Security and Peace (Vol. 29, No. 4, 2011), pp. 254–59; Claudia Hofmann and Ulrich Schneckener, ‘Engaging non-state armed actors in state and peace-building: options and strategies’, International Review of the Red Cross (Vol. 93, No. 883, 2011), pp. 603-621.

29. Authors’ interview with D. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. Amnah Ibraheem, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 3: The View from Bahrain and Kuwait’.

30. Authors’ interviews with F and H, a Kuwaiti subject matter expert, online, 12 January 2022. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. While Kuwait may recognise “the leading role of Saudi Arabia in the GCC” (see Andrius Avizius and Steffen Sachs, ‘Mission Report: Kuwait, 13-15 November 2017’, NATO, December 2017, https://www.nato-pa.int/download-file?filename=/sites/default/files/2018-01/MISSION%20REPORT%20CDS%20PC%20-%20KUWAIT%20-%20262%20JOINT%2017%20E.pdf), it would be overly simplistic to suggest that Kuwait defers to Saudi Arabia on all matters. For example, see the border dispute between Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in Bader Al-Saif, ‘Along the Kuwaiti-Saudi Border, Stability Is Built on Flexibility’, Carnegie Middle East Center, March 2021, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/alSaif_XBORDER_Kuwait_Saudi_Border1.pdf.
Also see Kuwait’s shifting position on Yemen in Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Kuwait’s Yemen foreign policy’, Middle East Institute, 12 August 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/kuwaits-yemen-foreign-policy; and Kuwait’s decision to provide only naval support to the GCC’s Peninsula Shield operation in Bahrain in 2011 – see ‘Kuwait says navy heading to Bahrain soon: ambassador’, Reuters, 17 March 2011, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-kuwait-bahrain-idUSTRE72G8NR20110317; and Yoel Guzansky, ‘Defence Cooperation in the Arabian Gulf: The Peninsula Shield Force Put to the Test’, Middle Eastern Studies (Vol. 50, No. 4, 2014), pp. 640-654. Finally, see internal opposition within Kuwait to the GCC Internal Security Pact, ‘GCC: Joint Security Agreement Imperils Rights,’ Human Rights Watch, 26 April 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2014/04/26/gcc-joint-security-agreement-imperils-rights.

31. Authors’ interviews with D, E and AT, a US-based Gulf expert, online, 6 December 2021. For an overview of Kuwaiti national security thinking after the 1990-91 Gulf War, see Andrew W. Terrill, Kuwaiti National Security and the U.S.-Kuwaiti Strategic Relationship After Saddam (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College, 2007); see also Michael Herb, ‘The Origins of Kuwait’s National Assembly’, LSE Kuwait Programme Paper Series, No. 39, March 2016 – Herb suggests that the national security threat posed by Iraq played an important role in shaping Kuwait’s domestic political institutions as well as its foreign policy.

32. Authors’ interviews with D, E, F, G, H and AT. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For further information on Kuwait’s Shi’a communities, see Kristin Smith Diwan, ‘Kuwait: Finding Balance in a Maximalist Gulf’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 29 June 2018, https://agsiw.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Diwan_Kuwait_ONLINE.pdf; Laurence Louër, ‘The Transformation of Shia Politics in the Gulf Monarchies’, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), October 2017, https://pomeps.org/the-transformation-of-shia-politics-in-the-gulf-monarchies#_ftn1; Robert Hatem and Derek Gildea, ‘Kuwaiti Shia: Government Policies, Societal Cleavages, and the Non-Factor of Iran’, IMES Capstone Paper Series, George Washington University, May 2011; Frederic M. Wehrey, Sectarian Politics in the Gulf: From the Iraq War to the Arab Uprisings (New York: Columbia University Press, 2013); Madeleine Wells, ‘Sectarianism and authoritarianism in Kuwait’, The Washington Post, 13 April 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2015/04/13/sectarianism-and-authoritarianism-in-kuwait/; Madeleine Wells, ‘Sectarianism, Authoritarianism, and Opposition in Kuwait’, in Nader Hashemi and Danny Postel (eds.), Sectarianization: Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East (London: Hurst & Co., 2017), pp. 235-257.

33. Authors’ interview with D. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For further information on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, see Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Program (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42849, 2012), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R42849.pdf; Shahram Chubin, ‘Is Iran a Military Threat?’, Survival (Vol. 56, No. 2, 2014), pp. 65-88; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran%E2%80%99s-rocket-and-missile-forces-and-strategic-options-0.

34. Authors’ interview with D. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021.

35. Authors’ interview with AT. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021.

36. Amnah Ibraheem, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 3: The View from Bahrain and Kuwait’.

37. Authors’ interviews with D and G. Kuwait’s initial reaction to the JCPOA deal in 2015 suggests that Kuwait’s government saw some potential security benefits of the nuclear agreement, see Nabih Bulos, ‘Iran deal: Arab world’s cautious reaction reflects deep fault lines’, Los Angeles Times, 14 July 2015, https://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-arab-world-reaction-iran-deal-20150714-story.html; also see Kuwait’s cautious and measured response to the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA agreement in 2018, Stephen Kalin and Sarah Dadouch, ‘Gulf Arab allies hail triumph after U.S. quits Iran deal’, Reuters, 8 May 2018, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-gulf-reaction-idUSKBN1I93CU. For further details on Kuwait’s reservations over the 2015 JCPOA deal, see Hamad Althunayyan, ‘Not the Iran Deal, it is Iran’s Policies’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 6 August 2015, https://agsiw.org/not-the-iran-deal-it-is-irans-policies/.

38. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. See Kuwait’s support for the IAEA in this statement from Kuwaiti diplomat Abdullah Al-Obaidi, ‘Kuwait applauds pivotal role of IAEA’, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 22 September 2019, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=2999365&language=en.

39. Authors’ interview with G. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021.

40. Authors’ interview with E.

41. Authors’ interviews with D and F. Similar concerns were expressed in 2015 by regional powers – many in the region believed that the 2015 JCPOA, by removing the Iran nuclear issue, would be used to justify a Western pivot away from the Middle East, see Kenneth M. Pollack, ‘U.S. policy toward the Middle East after the Iranian nuclear agreement’, Brookings, 5 August 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/testimonies/u-s-policy-toward-the-middle-east-after-the-iranian-nuclear-agreement/.

42. Authors’ interview with G. For further details on Iran’s use of soft power, see Edward Wastnidge, ‘The Modalities of Iranian Soft Power: From Cultural Diplomacy to Soft War’, Politics (Vol. 35, No. 3-4, 2015), pp. 364-377. For the limitations of Iran’s use of transnational Shi’a networks, see Jeffrey Haynes, ‘Iran and Shia transnational religious actors: Limits of political influence’, Civitas (Vol. 14, No. 3, 2014), pp. 450-466; see also, Laurence Louër, ‘The Limits of Iranian Influence Among Gulf Shi’a’, CTC Sentinel (Vol. 2, No. 5, 2009), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/Vol2Iss5-Art5.pdf.

43. Authors’ interview with G.

44. Authors’ interviews with F and H. For further information on the Shi’a merchant class in Kuwait and their role in domestic politics, see Rivka Azoulay, ‘The Politics of Shi’i Merchants in Kuwait’, in Steffen Hertog, Giacomo Luciani and Marc Valeri (eds.), Business Politics in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Co., 2015), pp. 67-99; for a more general overview of Kuwait’s merchant class, see J.R.L. Carter, Merchant Families of Kuwait (London: Scorpion Books, 1984).

45. Authors’ interview with G. For an overview of Kuwait’s position on the conflict in Yemen, see Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Kuwait’s Yemen foreign policy’, Middle East Institute, 12 August 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/kuwaits-yemen-foreign-policy. Kuwait’s initial contribution to the coalition is discussed in Justin Vela, ‘Kuwait role in Yemen a surprise, yet underlines frustrations with Tehran’, The National, 11 April 2015, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/kuwait-role-in-yemen-a-surprise-yet-underlines-frustrations-with-tehran-1.68907.

46. Authors’ interview with F. For more details on Iran’s H.O.P.E. initiative and the GCC states’ reactions, see Mehran Haghirian and Luciano Zaccara, ‘Making sense of HOPE: Can Iran’s Hormuz Peace Endeavor succeed?’, Atlantic Council, 3 October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/making-sense-of-hope-can-irans-hormuz-peace-endeavor-succeed/; see also, Reza Vaisi, ‘Iran, the GCC, and the failure of HOPE’, Middle East Institute, 24 September 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-gcc-and-failure-hope.

47. Authors’ interview with AT. For attempts to define and classify ‘small states’, see Jeanne A.K. Hey, ‘Introducing Small State Foreign Policy’, in Jeanne A.K. Hey (ed.), Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy Behavior (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003); Maurice A. East, ‘Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models’, World Politics (Vol. 25, No. 4, 1973), pp. 556-576; Giorgi Gvalia, David Siroky, Bidzina Lebanidze and Zurab Iashvili, ‘Thinking Outside the Bloc: Explaining the Foreign Policies of Small States’, Security Studies (Vol. 22, No. 1, 2013), pp. 98-131.

48. Authors’ interviews with D, F and H. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021.

49. Authors’ interviews with D, E, F and G. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For a contemporary analysis of GCC disunity in the wake of the blockade on Qatar in 2017, see ‘GCC summit serves to highlight disunity within the bloc’, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 7 December 2017, http://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=326203816; for an overview of Kuwait’s attempts to mediate in the GCC crisis, see Marwan Kabalan, ‘Kuwait’s GCC Mediation: Incentives and Reasons for Failure’, Arab Center Washington DC, 1 June 2018, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/kuwaits-gcc-mediation-incentives-and-reasons-for-failure/.

50. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For an overview of the security and strategic logic that drives Gulf states’ security partnerships and alliances with external powers, see Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, ‘Friends with Benefits: The Gulf States and the Perpetual Quest for Alliances’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 100-117.

51. Authors’ interviews with D, E, and F. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For an overview of relations between Kuwait and the US, Kenneth Katzman, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, RS21513, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS21513.pdf.

52. Authors’ interviews with D and F. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For an interview with Josep Borrell, the European Union’s High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, ahead of his trip to Kuwait and Qatar in March 2022, see Nawab Khan, ‘EU High Rep. Borrell: EU, Kuwait enjoy dynamic relationship’, Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 26 March 2022, https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3032227&language=en#.

53. Authors’ interviews with D, E, F, G and H. Amnah Ibraheem, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 3: The View from Bahrain and Kuwait’. For a historical perspective on Kuwait’s relations with the UK, see Fiona Venn, ‘A Struggle for Supremacy? Great Britain, the United States and Kuwaiti Oil in the 1930s’, Research Papers No. 2, University of Essex, December 2012, https://www1.essex.ac.uk/history/documents/research/RP2_Venn_2012.pdf; Peter Mangold, ‘Britain and the Defence of Kuwait, 1956-71’, RUSI Journal (Vol. 120, No. 3, 1975), pp. 44-48; Helene von Bismarck, ‘The Kuwait Crisis of 1961 and its Consequences for Great Britain’s Persian Gulf Policy’, British Scholar (Vol. 2, No. 1, 2009), pp. 75-96.

54. Authors’ interview with F. For further details on Kuwait’s relations with China, see Mordechai Chaziza, ‘China’s Strategic Partnership with Kuwait: New Opportunities for the Belt and Road Initiative’, Contemporary Review of the Middle East (Vol. 7, No. 4, 2020), pp. 501-519.

55. Authors’ interviews with D and E. Kuwaiti officials’ suggestion that Kuwait will be the last Gulf state to normalise relations with Israel (see ‘Kuwait says it’ll be ‘last to normalize’ with Israel, will stand by Palestinians’, The Times of Israel, 16 August 2020, https://www.timesofisrael.com/kuwaiti-officials-reject-israel-normalization-reaffirm-support-for-palestinians/) highlights how Kuwait’s domestic politics influences its foreign policies. See Courtney Freer, ‘How politics at home shapes Kuwait’s foreign policy’, Brookings, 19 November 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2020/11/19/how-politics-at-home-shapes-kuwaits-foreign-policy/. See also Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Kuwait’s pro-Palestine solidarity stands out as Israel normalisation deals put to the test’, The New Arab, 19 May 2021, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/kuwait-stands-palestine-israel-normalisation-deals-tested.

56. Authors’ interviews with I, an Omani subject matter expert, online, 9 September 2021, J, an Omani journalist, online, 14 September 2021 and AT, a US-based Gulf expert, online, 6 December 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio, 10 March, 2022, https://rusi.org/podcasts/mind-the-gulf/episode-4-view-qatar-and-oman.

57. Authors’ interviews with K, an Oman-based subject matter expert, online, 20 October 2021 and AT. For an explanation on divergent threat perceptions among the Gulf states, see Cinzia Bianco, ‘The GCC Monarchies: Perceptions of the Iranian Threat amid Shifting Geopolitics’, The International Spectator (Vol. 55, No. 2, 2020), pp. 92-107.

58. Authors’ interviews with I and J. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’. For further information on the Iranian military intervention in Oman (1972-75) in support of Sultan Qaboos, see James F. Goode, ‘Assisting Our Brothers, Defending Ourselves: The Iranian Intervention in Oman, 1972-75’, Iranian Studies (Vol. 47, No. 3, 2014), pp. 441-462; see also contemporary news reports such as ‘New Iranian Offensive in Oman,’ MERIP Reports (No. 43, 1975), pp. 23 and Eric Pace, ‘Iranian Troops Helping Oman to Quell Rebels’, The New York Times, 7 February 1975, https://www.nytimes.com/1975/02/07/archives/iranian-troops-helping-oman-to-quell-rebels.html.

59. Authors’ interview with I. For further details on Oman’s relationship with other GCC states, see Giorgio Cafiero and Adam Yefet, ‘Oman and the GCC: A Solid Relationship?’, Middle East Policy (Vol. 23, No. 3, 2016), pp. 49-55.

60. Authors’ interviews with I, J and K. For context on tensions around the Strait of Hormuz during the ‘Tanker War’ in the 1980s, see Martin S. Navias, ‘Oil and Water’, History Today (Vol. 69, No. 8, 2019), pp. 56-63. For an overview of the Strait of Hormuz’s importance to global oil flows, see ‘The Strait of Hormuz is the world’s most important oil transit chokepoint’, World Economic Forum, 27 December 2019, https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=42338.

61. Authors’ interviews with I, J, and AT. For an insight into Oman’s concerns about the Strait of Hormuz, see comments made by then Omani foreign minister Yousuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah in ‘Oman sees biggest Gulf clash risk in Strait of Hormuz’, Reuters, 16 February 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-germany-security-oman-hormuz-idUSKBN20A0BL.

62. Authors’ interview with AT. For further details on Oman’s concerns in Yemen see Roby C. Barrett, ‘Oman’s Balancing Act in the Yemen Conflict’, Middle East Institute, 17 June 2015, https://www.mei.edu/publications/omans-balancing-act-yemen-conflict and, for further information on the eastern Yemeni province of Mahra in particular, Ahmed Nagi, ‘Oman’s Boiling Yemeni Border’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 22 March 2019, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/22/oman-s-boiling-yemeni-border-pub-78668.

63. Authors’ interviews with K and AT. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’.

64. Authors’ interviews with I and K. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For further details on the links between nuclear weapons and national prestige, see Barry O’Neill, ‘Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige’, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1560, Yale University, February 2006, https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d15/d1560.pdf.

65. Authors’ interviews with K and AT. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’. For details on Oman’s role in facilitating the 2015 JCPOA talks, see contemporary news reports such as Jay Solomon, ‘Secret Dealings With Iran Led to Nuclear Talks,’ The Wall Street Journal, 28 June 2015, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-wish-list-led-to-u-s-talks-1435537004; Indira A.R. Lakshmanan, ‘“If You Can’t Do This Deal … Go Back to Tehran”: The inside story of the Obama administration’s Iran diplomacy’, Politico, 25 September 2015, https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/09/iran-deal-inside-story-213187/.

66. Authors’ interviews with K and AT.

67. Authors’ interviews with K and AT. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’.

68. Authors’ interviews with I, J, K and AT. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For further details on Oman’s relationship with Iran, see Hani Albasoos, Zeinab Mohammed Ali, Asila S. Al Hasni and Sara Al Shizawi, ‘The Nature of Oman’s Relations with Iran’, Sultan Qaboos University: Journal of Arts & Social Sciences (Vol. 10. No. 1, 2019), pp. 5-14; Maryam Al-Bolushi, ‘The effect of Omani-Iranian relations on the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries after the Arab Spring’, Contemporary Arab Affairs (Vol. 9, No. 3, 2016), pp. 383-399; Marral Shamshiri-Fard, ‘Why Oman Loves Iran’, Foreign Policy, 16 January 2020, https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/01/16/sultan-qaboos-oman-loves-iran-shah/; Ahmet Uysal, ‘What is Unique About the Omani-Iranian Relations?’, Center for Iranian Studies in Ankara, 26 August 2016, https://iramcenter.org/en/what-is-unique-about-the-omani-iranian-relations.

69. Authors’ interviews with I, J and K. For an overview of how Oman’s position fits in with the rest of the GCC, see Yoel Guzansky, ‘The Foreign-Policy Tools of Small Powers: Strategic Hedging in the Persian Gulf’, Middle East Policy (Vol. 22, No. 1, 2015), pp. 112-122.

70. Authors’ interviews with I and J. For further details on Oman’s role as a potential mediator in the conflict in Yemen, see Tobias Borck and Moosa al-Kharusi, ‘Omani Mediation: A Chance for Yemen?’, RUSI, 7 September 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/omani-mediation-chance-yemen; Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Oman’s Diplomatic Agenda in Yemen’, Arab Center Washington DC, 30 June 2021, https://arabcenterdc.org/resource/omans-diplomatic-agenda-in-yemen/.

71. Authors’ interview with AT. For an overview of Oman’s planned infrastructure projects with Iran, see Yakir Gillis, ‘Oman: Iran’s best friend in the Gulf’, Financial Times, 11 April 2016, https://www.ft.com/content/59e135c7-5629-3bb4-ad76-1a449a7dfd57. For the importance of the semi-regulated Oman-Iran smuggling routes, see Alexander Balas, ‘The smugglers of Musandam’, The Lowy Institute, 14 November 2017, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/smugglers-musandam.

72. Authors’ interviews with I, J and AT. For a study focused on Oman’s ability to facilitate talks between Saudi Arabia, Iran, the Houthi rebels and the United States, see Giorgio Cafiero and Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Oman’s Pragmatic Yemen Foreign Policy: Poised for Promoting Peace?’, Inside Arabia, 12 October 2018, https://insidearabia.com/oman-pragmatic-yemen-foreign-policy-peace/.

73. Authors’ interviews with I and J. For an overview of Saudi-Iran talks, see Hasan Alhasan and Layal Alghoozi, ‘The fragile diplomacy of Saudi-Iranian de-escalation’, IISS, 7 December 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/12/the-fragile-diplomacy-of-saudi-iranian-de-escalation; Hussein Ibish, ‘Saudi Arabia’s New Dialogue With Iran was Long in the Making’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 4 May 2021, https://agsiw.org/saudi-arabias-new-dialogue-with-iran-was-long-in-the-making/.

74. Authors’ interview with I.

75. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’. For further details on the bilateral relationship between Oman and the US, see Kenneth Katzman, ‘Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy’, Congressional Research Service (RS21534), 20 June 2018, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21534/87; Jonathan Schanzer and Nicole Salter, Oman in the Middle: Muscat’s Balancing Act Between Iran and America (Washington DC: FDD Press, 2019).

76. Authors’ interview with I. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’. The UK’s recent Integrated Review identified Oman as a country with which the UK has ‘strong’ and ‘historic bilateral ties in the Middle East and North Africa region’. According to the Integrated Review, these ties are ‘vital to UK prosperity and security’. In addition, Oman’s importance to the UK’s regional defence posture, through its naval facilities at Duqm and access to allied training facilities, is underlined in the UK’s Defence Command Paper. For further information, see HM Government, Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, CP 403 (London: The Stationery Office, 2021) and HM Government, Defence in a Competitive Age, CP 411 (London: The Stationery Office, 2021). For a historical overview of the UK’s bilateral relationship with Oman, see Joseph A. Kechichian, Oman and the World: The Emergence of an Independent Foreign Policy (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 1995). In addition, for more details on UK military support to the Sultan of Oman’s Armed Forces during the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-76), see John Akehurst, We Won a War: The Campaign in Oman, 1965-75 (Salisbury: Michael Russell, 1982); and Tony Jeapes, SAS Secret War: Operation Storm in the Middle East (London: Greenhill, 2005).

77. Turki al-Bulushi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’. For further details on economic ties between Oman and China, see Robert Mogielnicki, ‘Oman’s Bittersweet Economic Relations With China’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 21 July 2020, https://agsiw.org/omans-bittersweet-economic-relations-with-china/.

78. Authors’ interview with AT. While Oman has long had quiet diplomatic ties with Israel, Oman will be required to balance various competing geopolitical interests before deciding whether to follow the UAE and Bahrain in normalising ties with Israel. For further details on this, see Uzi Rabi, ‘Israel and the Gulf: Future Prospects for Normalization’, The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 5 April 2021, https://dayan.org/content/israel-and-gulf-future-prospects-normalization; Michael Stephens, ‘Israel and the Gulf States: Normalisation and Lingering Challenges’, RUSI, 15 September 2020, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/israel-and-gulf-states-normalisation-and-lingering-challenges; Giorgio Cafiero, ‘Oman: Israel’s Door to the Muslim World?’, Gulf International Forum, 30 October 2018, https://gulfif.org/oman-israels-door-to-the-muslim-world/; ‘Oman content with current Israel relationship, foreign minister says’, Reuters, 11 February 2021, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oman-politics-idUSKBN2AB1XB.

79. Authors’ interviews with M, a Qatari subject matter expert, online, 19 October 2021; N, a Qatari government official, online, 25 October 2021; and O, a UK-based subject matter expert, online, 30 November 2021. For an overview of Qatar and Iran’s bilateral relations, see Mehran Kamrava, ‘Iran-Qatar Relations’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam and Gawdat Bahgat (eds.), Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 167-187. For an analysis of the state of relations between the two countries 10-years ago, see Alex Vatanka, ‘The Odd Couple’, Middle East Institute, 26 March 2012, https://www.mei.edu/publications/odd-couple.

80. Authors’ interview with N. For a historicised perspective on Iran’s national security drivers, see Ariane M. Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National Security Strategy (London: Hurst &Co., 2020).

81. Authors’ interview with M. For an overview of Iran’s instruments of soft and hard power, see Amin Saikal, ‘Iran: Aspirations and Constraints’, in Adham Saouli (ed.), Unfulfilled Aspirations: Middle Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Co., 2020), pp. 113-134.

82. Authors’ interview with O. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For a brief overview of Iran’s activities in states such as Lebanon and Syria, see Sanam Vakil and Neil Quilliam, ‘Steps to enable a Middle East regional security process: Reviving the JCPOA,
de-escalating conflicts and building trust’, Chatham House, April 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/2021-04-14-steps-middle-east-security-vakil-quilliam_1.pdf. For an analyses focused on Iraq, see Michael Knights, Phillip Smyth and Ahmed Ali, ‘Iranian Influence in Iraq: Between Balancing and Hezbollahzation?’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1 June 2015, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/iranian-influence-iraq-between-balancing-and-hezbollahzation; Hamidreza Azizi, ‘Challenges to Iran’s Role in Iraq in the Post-Soleimani Era’, SWP Comment No. 44, July 2021, https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/comments/2021C44_IransRoleInIraq.pdf; for a general overview, see Afshon Ostovar, ‘Iran, Its Clients, and the Future of the Middle East: The Limits of Religion,’ International Affairs (Vol. 94, No. 6, 2018), pp. 1237–55.

83. Authors’ interviews with M, N, O and P, a Qatar-based subject matter expert, online, 27 January 2022.

84. Authors’ interview with P. Andreas Krieg, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio, 10 March 2022, https://rusi.org/podcasts/mind-the-gulf/episode-4-view-qatar-and-oman.

85. Authors’ interviews with M and P. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. Andreas Krieg, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio, 10 March 2022. For background on the 2017 GCC crisis, see Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Qatar: The Gulf’s Problem Child’, The Atlantic, 5 June 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/qatar-gcc-saudi-arabia-yemen-bahrain/529227/; see also Jane Kinninmont, ‘The Gulf Divided The Impact of the Qatar Crisis’, Chatham House, May 2019, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2019-05-30-Gulf%20Crisis_0.pdf; for the demands placed on Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt, see ‘The 13 demands on Qatar from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the UAE and Egypt’, The National, 23 June 2017, https://www.thenationalnews.com/world/the-13-demands-on-qatar-from-saudi-arabia-bahrain-the-uae-and-egypt-1.93329; for an overview of Qatar’s regional foreign policies since 2011, see Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, Qatar and the Arab Spring (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); for increased exchanges between Iran and Qatar after the imposition of the 2017 blockade, see Simeon Kerr and Ahmed Al Omran, ‘Qatar restores diplomatic ties with Iran’, The Financial Times, 24 August 2017, https://www.ft.com/content/bd8f21c8-889d-11e7-bf50-e1c239b45787; ‘Qatar blockade: Iran sends five planeloads of food’, BBC News, 11 June 2017, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-40237721.

86. Authors’ interview with O. Andreas Krieg, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio 10 March 2022. For further information on the North Dome/South Pars gas field, see Regan E. Doherty, ‘Factbox: Qatar, Iran share world’s biggest gas field’, Reuters, 26 July 2010, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-northfield-qatar-idUSTRE66P1VV20100726; ‘Qatar-Iran ties: Sharing the world’s largest gas field’, Al-Jazeera, 15 June 2017, https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2017/6/15/qatar-iran-ties-sharing-the-worlds-largest-gas-field.

87. Authors’ interviews with M and O. For a historical overview of Qatar’s merchant class, see Jill Crystal, Oil and Politics in the Gulf: Rulers and Merchants in Kuwait and Qatar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

88. Authors’ interviews with M, N, O and P. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021.

89. Authors’ interviews with N, O and P. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021.

90. Authors’ interviews with N and P.

91. Authors’ interviews with M and N. For an overview of some of the risks posed to the region by a regional power’s civilian nuclear programme, see Bilal Y. Saab and Nilsu Goren, ‘Atomic Bonds in an Age of Entropy: The Pursuit of a Nuclear Security Framework in the Middle East’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation, 2018), pp. 260-273.

92. Authors’ interviews with N, O and P. Andreas Krieg, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio, 10 March 2022. For Qatari officials expressing support for a revived nuclear deal, see ‘Qatar calls for nuclear deal with Iran’, The New Arab, 27 March 2022, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/news/qatar-calls-nuclear-deal-iran; ‘Qatar works to revive Iran nuclear deal’, Al-Monitor, 11 February 2011, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/02/qatar-foreign-minister-iran-nuclear-deal-thani-us.html.

93. Authors’ interview with O.

94. Authors’ interview with M. For the difficulties of including Gulf states in the nuclear negotiations process, see Shireen Hunter, ‘Involving regional states in Iran talks is a recipe for failure’, Responsible Statecraft, 6 February 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/02/06/involving-regional-states-in-iran-deal-talks-is-a-recipe-for-failure/; Saeid Jafari, ‘Why Iran will not let Arab states join nuclear talks’, Atlantic Council, 25 March 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-iran-will-not-let-arab-states-join-nuclear-talks/; Tobias Borck, ‘The Gulf States and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, RUSI, 29 November 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/gulf-states-and-iran-nuclear-deal-between-rock-and-hard-place.

95. Authors’ interviews with N and P. For further details on Iran’s use of transnational religious networks as part of its foreign policy, see Edward Wastnidge, ‘Iran’s Shia Diplomacy: Religious Identity and Foreign Policy in the Islamic Republic’, Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs and the Brookings Institution, September 2020, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/iran-s-shia-diplomacy-religious-identity-and-foreign-policy-in-the-islamic-republic.

96. Authors’ interview with M. For further details on some of these misperceptions, see Fred Halliday, ‘Arabs and Persians beyond the Geopolitics of the Gulf’, Cahiers d’études sur la Méditerranée orientale et le monde turco-iranien (Vol. 22, 1996), http://journals.openedition.org/cemoti/143.

97. Authors’ interviews with M and O.

98. Authors’ interview with P.

99. Authors’ interview with M. For more details on Iran’s H.O.P.E. initiative and the GCC states’ reactions, see Mehran Haghirian and Luciano Zaccara, ‘Making sense of HOPE: Can Iran’s Hormuz Peace Endeavor succeed?’, Atlantic Council, 3 October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/making-sense-of-hope-can-irans-hormuz-peace-endeavor-succeed/; see also, Reza Vaisi, ‘Iran, the GCC, and the failure of HOPE’, Middle East Institute, 24 September 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-gcc-and-failure-hope.

100. Authors’ interview with N. For an analysis on how a revived JCPOA deal could serve as a basis for wider regional cooperation, see Farzan Sabet, ‘Iran Deal Scenarios and Regional Security’, Arms Control Today, October 2021, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-10/features/iran-deal-scenarios-regional-security; see also Sanam Vakil and Neil Quilliam, ‘Steps to enable a Middle East regional security process’, Chatham House, April 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/2021-04/2021-04-14-steps-middle-east-security-vakil-quilliam_1.pdf.

101. Authors’ interviews with M and N. For further details on Qatar’s distinct diplomatic role as a regional moderator, see Andrew F. Cooper and Bessma Momani, ‘Qatar and Expanded Contours of Small State Diplomacy’, The International Spectator (Vol. 46, No. 3, 2011), pp. 113-128.

102. Authors’ interview with N. For a discussion on the economic impact in Iran of the lifting of sanctions linked to the original JCPOA deal in 2015, see Cyrus Amir-Mokri and Hamid Biglari, ‘A Windfall for Iran?:
The End of Sanctions and the Iranian Economy’, Foreign Affairs (Vol. 94, 2015), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/iran/2015-10-20/windfall-iran; see also the World Bank’s estimates, Elena Ianchovichina, Shantayanan Devarajan and Csilla Lakatos, ‘Lifting Economic Sanctions on Iran: Global Effects and Strategic Responses’, World Bank Group, Policy Research Working Paper 7549, February 2016, https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/298681467999709496/pdf/WPS7549.pdf.

103. Authors’ interviews with N and O. For an analysis of the strategic pillars on which Qatari foreign policy is founded, see Steven Wright, ‘Foreign Policies with International Reach: The Case of Qatar’, in David Held and Kristian Ulrichsen (eds.), The Transformation of the Gulf: Politics, Economics and the Global Order (London: Routledge, 2011).

104. Authors’ interviews with N and O. Andreas Krieg, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio, 10 March 2022. For an overview of relations between Qatar and the US, Kenneth Katzman, Qatar: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R44533, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44533.pdf; also see Qatar’s recent designation as a major non-NATO ally of the US, ‘Biden designates Qatar as major non-NATO ally of U.S.’, Reuters, 10 March 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/biden-designates-qatar-major-non-nato-ally-us-2022-03-10/; for analysis, see R. Clarke Cooper, ‘As Qatar becomes a non-NATO ally, greater responsibility conveys with the status’, Atlantic Council, 3 March 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/as-qatar-becomes-a-non-nato-ally-greater-responsibility-coveys-with-the-status/; for details on the US’ Al Udeid base in Qatar, see Adam Taylor, ‘As Trump tries to end “endless wars,” America’s biggest Mideast base is getting bigger’, The Washington Post, 21 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/as-trump-tries-to-end-endless-wars-americas-biggest-mideast-base-is-getting-bigger/2019/08/20/47ac5854-bab4-11e9-8e83-4e6687e99814_story.html; see also ‘Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar’, GlobalSecurity.org, https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/udeid.htm.

105. Authors’ interviews with O and P.

106. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For further details on Europe’s relations with Qatar, see Nayef bin Nahar, ‘Qatar’, Mapping European Leverage in the MENA Region, European Council on Foreign Relations, December 2019, https://ecfr.eu/special/mapping_eu_leverage_mena/qatar.

107. Authors’ interviews with N and O. Andreas Krieg, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 4: The View from Qatar and Oman’, podcast audio, 10 March 2022. For further details on the UK’s relations with Qatar, see Tobias Borck and Michael Stephens, ‘The Gulf’, in Christopher Phillips and Michael Stephens (eds.), What Next for Britain in the Middle East? (London: I.B. Tauris, 2022), pp. 165-179; Mark Sedgwick, ‘Britain and the Middle East’, in Jack Covurrabias and Tom Lansford (eds.), Strategic Interests in the Middle East: Opposition or Support for US Foreign Policy (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2007), pp. 3-25; James Tobin, ‘UK relations with Qatar’, House of Lords Library, 17 January 2022, https://lordslibrary.parliament.uk/uk-relations-with-qatar/.

108. Authors’ interview with P. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 20 December 2021. For further background on Qatar’s relations with Israel, see Michal Yaari, ‘Israel and Qatar: Relations Nurtured by the Palestinian Issue’, Mitvim, March 2020, https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/Dr._Michal_Yaari_-_Israel_and_Qatar_-_Relations_nurtured_by_the_Palestinian_issue_-_March_2020-1.pdf.

109. Authors’ interview with M. For further details on Qatar’s ties with Turkey, see Birol Baskan, Turkey and Qatar in the Tangled Geopolitics of the Middle East (New York: Palgrave, 2016); Meliha Benli Altunışık, ‘The end of the Gulf rift may not signal the end of Turkey-Qatar relations’, Atlantic Council, 5 April 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/turkeysource/the-end-of-the-gulf-rift-may-not-signal-the-end-of-turkey-qatar-relations/.

110. Authors’ interviews with Q, a Saudi government official, online, 30 July 2021; R, a Saudi government official, online, 21 September 2021; S, a Saudi subject matter expert official, online, 27 September 2021; T, a Saudi subject matter expert, online, 7 November 2021; U, a Saudi government official, online, 20 October 2021; and W, a Saudi journalist, online, 22 November 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022, https://rusi.org/podcasts/mind-the-gulf/episode-2-view-saudi-arabia. For background on Saudi Arabia-Iran relations, see Awadh Al-Badi, ‘Saudi-Iranian Relations: A Troubled Trajectory’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam and Gawdat Bahgat (eds.), Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 189-209; also see, Simon Mabon, Saudi Arabia and Iran: Soft Power Rivalry in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013). For further details on Iran’s use of transnational religious networks as part of its foreign policy, see Edward Wastnidge, ‘Iran’s Shia Diplomacy: Religious Identity and Foreign Policy in the Islamic Republic’, Georgetown University’s Berkley Center for Religion, Peace, and World Affairs and the Brookings Institution, September 2020, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/publications/iran-s-shia-diplomacy-religious-identity-and-foreign-policy-in-the-islamic-republic.

111. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, T, U and W. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. For a historical perspective on the ideological underpinnings of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, see Hamid Dabashi, Theology of Discontent: The Ideological Foundation of the Islamic Revolution in Iran (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2006); for further information on the Iranian government’s sources of legitimacy, see Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2019).

112. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, S, T and W. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For details on Saudi Arabia’s threat perceptions, as well as those of other Gulf states, see W. Andrew Terrill, Arab Threat Perceptions and the Future of the U.S. Military Presence in the Middle East (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute United States Army War College Press, 2015).

113. Authors’ interview with T. For an overview of Iran’s relations with its Gulf Arab neighbours, see Dina Esfandiary, ‘No Country for Oversimplifications: Understanding Iran’s Views on the Future of Regional Security Dialogue and Architecture’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 197-214; see also Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R44017, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017; and see Shireen Hunter, ‘Iran’s Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: Dynamics of Continuity and Change’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam and Gawdat Bahgat (eds.), Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 11-38.

114. Authors’ interview with Q and U. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. The current Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, took great care to draw a distinction between the Iranian government and the Iranian population in his op-ed for The New York Times, see Adel Bin Ahmed Al-Jubeir, ‘Can Iran Change?’, The New York Times, 19 January 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/19/opinion/saudi-arabia-can-iran-change.html.

115. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, S, T, U and W. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For further details on Iran’s use of non-state actors, see Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); for a study focused on Iraq’s militias, see Norman Cigar, Iraq’s Shia Warlords and their Militias: Political and Security Challenges and Options (US Army War College Press, 2015); Afshon Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War’, Security Studies (Vol. 28, No. 1, 2019), pp. 159-188.

116. Authors’ interviews with R, T and U. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For details on Iran’s relationship with the Houthis, see Thomas Juneau, ‘Iran’s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest Investment’, International Affairs (Vol. 92, No. 3, 2016), pp. 647–63; also see Maysam Behravesh, ‘What Is in Yemen for Iran? A Realist Assessment of Tehran’s Strategic Calculus in the Arabian Peninsula’, in Achim Vogt and Sarah Schmid (eds.), Navigating the Regional Chessboard: Europe’s Options to Address Conflicts in the MENA Region (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/17006.pdf. For background on the Houthi’s strikes against Saudi Arabia, see Seth G. Jones, Jared Thompson, Danielle Ngo, Brian McSorley and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., ‘The Iranian and Houthi War against Saudi Arabia’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2021, https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/211221_Jones_IranianHouthi_SaudiArabia.pdf?fn1d98tAhj7yOUr.IncppMueLOC4kv83.

117. Authors’ interviews with R and S. For background on Saudi Arabia’s domestic stability concerns, see Frederic Wehrey, ‘The Forgotten Uprising in Eastern Saudi Arabia’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 June 2013, https://carnegieendowment.org/2013/06/14/forgotten-uprising-in-eastern-saudi-arabia-pub-52093; for the importance of religious legitimacy to both the Saudi Arabian and Iranian governments, see Simon Mabon, ‘The Kingdom and the Glory?’, in Adham Saouli (ed.), Unfulfilled Aspirations: Middle Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Hurst & Co., 2020), pp. 135-156.

118. Authors’ interviews with T and W. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. For further information on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, see Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Program (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42849, 2012), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R42849.pdf; Shahram Chubin, ‘Is Iran a Military Threat?’, Survival (Vol. 56, No. 2, 2014), pp. 65-88; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran%E2%80%99s-rocket-and-missile-forces-and-strategic-options-0.

119. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, T and U. For Saudi concerns about being caught in an escalating US-Iranian conflict, see Jackie Northam, ‘Saudi Arabia Sought Dialogue With Iran. Then The U.S.-Iranian Conflict Escalated’, NPR, 9 January 2020, https://text.npr.org/794519810.

120. Authors’ interviews with Q and R.

121. Authors’ interviews with R, S and U.

122. Authors’ interview with S. For differing views on the threat of regional nuclear proliferation, see Gawdat Bahgat, ‘A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East: Myth or Reality?’, Mediterranean Quarterly (Vol. 22, No. 1, 2011), pp. 27–40; Richard L. Russell, ‘Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race’, JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly (Vol. 58, 2010), pp 94–99.

123. Authors’ interview with Q. For further details on Iran’s nuclear programme as a ‘bargaining chip’, Mayumi Fukushima, ‘No-Go Negotiations: Iran May Not Be in a Rush to Get Nuclear Weapons’, The National Interest, 27 June 2021, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/no-go-negotiations-iran-may-not-be-rush-get-nuclear-weapons-188540.

124. Authors’ interview with Q. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021.

125. Authors’ interview with R. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. For details on the original JCPOA deal’s ‘sunset clauses’, see Kelsey Davenport, ‘Iran Nuclear Deal ‘Sunset’ Gets Scrutiny’, Arms Control Today, October 2017, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2017-10/news/iran-nuclear-deal-sunset-gets-scrutiny.

126. Authors’ interviews with R, T and U. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For further information on the debate around US ‘withdrawal’ from the Middle East, see F. Gregory Gause, III, ‘What Does U.S. “Withdrawal” From the Middle East Mean?’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 10 December 2021, https://agsiw.org/what-does-u-s-withdrawal-from-the-middle-east-mean/; F. Gregory Gause, III, ‘Should We Stay or Should We Go? The United States and the Middle East’, Survival (Vol. 61, No. 5, 2019), pp. 7-24.

127. Authors’ interviews with Q, R and T. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021.
Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022.

128. Authors’ interviews with R, S, T and U. For a description of Iran as a revolutionary power, see Soner Cagaptay, James F. Jeffrey and Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Iran Won’t Give up on its Revolution’, The New York Times, 26 April 2015, https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/27/opinion/iran-wont-give-up-on-its-revolution.html.

129. Authors’ interviews with R, S and T. For previous examples of high-level engagement between Saudi and Iranian officials, see the 2007 meeting between Saudi king Abdullah and Iranian president Ahmadinejad – Hassan M. Fattah, ‘Saudi king meets with Iranian president’, The New York Times, 4 March 2007, https://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/04/world/africa/04iht-saudi.4794133.html.

130. Authors’ interviews with T and AS, a Qatar-based subject matter expert, online, 27 January 2022.

131. Authors’ interviews with T, U and AS. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. To what extent Iran would be able to shape the Houthis’ decision-making is debated among analysts, see, for example, Mareike Transfeld, ‘Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 14 February 2017, https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/67988.

132. Authors’ interviews with R, T and W. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For a snapshot of Iranian influence in Iraq in the mid-2000s, see Kenneth Katzman, ‘Iran’s Influence in Iraq’, Congressional Research Service: Issue Brief, August 2007, pp. 1–6; for a more recent perspective, see Jessica Watkins, ‘Iran in Iraq: The Limits of “Smart Power” Amidst Public Protest’, LSE Middle East Centre Paper Series, No. 37, July 2020, http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/105768/4/Iran_in_Iraq.pdf. For a study focused on Iraq’s militias, see Norman Cigar, Iraq’s Shia Warlords and their Militias: Political and Security Challenges and Options (US Army War College Press, 2015). For Saudi policy towards Iraq, see Alex Grinberg, ‘Saudi Reset with Iraq’, MERIA Journal (Vol. 33, No. 3, 2017), pp. 1–6.

133. Authors’ interviews with Q and S. For background on Iran’s boycott of the Hajj in 2016, see ‘Iran Boycotts the Hajj’, Middle East Policy Council, https://mepc.org/commentary/iran-boycotts-hajj; Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Iran’s Ideological Exploitation of the Hajj’, The Washington Institute, 12 September 2016, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/irans-ideological-exploitation-hajj.

134. Authors’ interview with T. For tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran in international oil markets, see Frederic Wehrey, Theodore W. Karasik, Alireza Nader, Jeremy Ghez, Lydia Hansell and Robert A. Guffey, Saudi-Iranian Relations Since the Fall of Saddam: Rivalry, Cooperation, and Implications for U.S. Policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009), pp. 72-75.

135. Authors’ interviews with Q and T. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021.

136. Authors’ interviews with Q, S and T. For details on Saudi Arabia’s dialogues with Iran, see Hussein Ibish, ‘Saudi Arabia’s New Dialogue With Iran was Long in the Making’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 4 May 2021, https://agsiw.org/saudi-arabias-new-dialogue-with-iran-was-long-in-the-making/; also see Hasan Alhasan and Layal Alghoozi, ‘The fragile diplomacy of Saudi–Iranian de-escalation’, IISS, 7 December 2021, https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/12/the-fragile-diplomacy-of-saudi-iranian-de-escalation.

137. Authors’ interview with U. For background on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), see Shaher Awawdeh, ‘An Introduction to the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’, NYU Law, May/June 2020, https://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/OIC.html. For details on how the Iran-Saudi Arabia rivalry impacts on the OIC, see Ildus G. Ilishev, ‘The Iran-Saudi Arabia Conflict and its Impact on the Organization of Islamic Cooperation’, The Wilson Center, June 2016, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/
the_iran_saudi_arabia_conflict_and_its_impact_on_the_organization_of_islamic_cooperation.pdf.

138. Authors’ interviews with R, U and T. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. For an overview of how regional powers in the Gulf have sought to cultivate ties with external powers to acquire security guarantees, see Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, ‘Friends with Benefits: The Gulf States and the Perpetual Quest for Alliances’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation, 2018), pp. 100-117.

139. Authors’ interviews with Q and U. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. For example, see the positive reaction in Saudi Arabia to the news that the UN Security Council had designated the Houthis as a terrorist organisation, ‘Saudi Arabia Welcomes UN Security Council’s Terrorist Designation of Houthis’, Asharq Al-Awsat, 1 March 2022, https://english.aawsat.com/home/article/3503796/saudi-arabia-welcomes-un-security-councils-terrorist-designation-houthis.

140. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, T and U. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For further details on US-Saudi relations, see Christopher M. Blanchard, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, RL33533, 2021), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33533.pdf; Neil Quilliam, ‘Saudi Arabia puts US relationship on the back burner’, Chatham House, 11 November 2021, https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/11/saudi-arabia-puts-us-relationship-back-burner; for many in the region, the removal of US missile defence systems and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia in 2021 sent concerning signals, see ‘U.S. pulls missile defenses in Saudi Arabia amid Yemen attacks’, Politico, 11 September 2021, https://www.politico.com/news/2021/09/11/missile-defense-saudi-arabia-511320.

141. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, S, T, U and W. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. Mohammed Alyahya, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 2: The View from Saudi Arabia’, podcast audio, 10 February 2022. For a historical overview of the UK’s engagement in the region, see Robert T. Harrison, Britain in the Middle East: 1619-1971 (London: Bloomsbury, 2016). For UK relations with the Gulf after Brexit, see Tobias Borck and Michael Stephens, ‘The Gulf’, in Christopher Phillips and Michael Stephens (eds.), What Next for Britain in the Middle East? (London: I.B. Tauris, 2022); also see Joe Devanny and Philip Berry, ‘“Gulf Security is Our Security”: Global Britain and UK Gulf Strategy, 2010-20’, Defence Studies (Vol. 21, No. 2, 2021), pp. 141-161. For analysis of UK prime minister Boris Johnson’s recent visit to Saudi Arabia, see David Roberts, ‘Saudi Arabia: why Boris Johnson not getting an instant deal is down to history’, King’s College London, 25 March 2022, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/saudi-arabia-why-boris-johnson-not-getting-an-instant-deal-is-down-to-history.

142. Authors’ interviews with Q, S and T. For details on China’s involvement in the Gulf, see Jean-Loup Samaan, Strategic Hedging in the Arabian Peninsula: The Politics of the Gulf-Asian Rapprochement, RUSI Whitehall Papers, Vol. 92 (London: RUSI, 2018).

143. Authors’ interviews with Q, R, T, U and AS. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 28 September 2021. For background on relations between Saudi Arabia and Israel, see Michal Yaari, ‘Israel and Saudi Arabia: On the Way to Normalization?’, Mitvim, July 2018, https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/English_-_Michal_Yaari_-_Israel-Saudi_Arabia_cooperation_-_July_2018.pdf. For Saudi Arabia’s position on the Arab-Israeli Peace Process, see Gawdat Bahgat, ‘Saudi Arabia and the Arab-Israeli Peace Process’ Middle East Policy (Vol. 14, No. 3, 2007), pp. 49–59.

144. Authors’ interview with X, a former Emirati government official, online, 13 October 2021. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022, https://rusi.org/podcasts/mind-the-gulf/episode-5-view-united-arab-emirates. For more information on the impact of domestic politics on UAE foreign policy, see Sean Foley, ‘What Wealth Cannot Buy: UAE Security at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century’, in Barry M. Rubin (ed.), Crises in the Contemporary Persian Gulf (London: F. Cass, 2002); Durham University, UK, ‘The Making of UAE Foreign Policy: A “Dynamic Process Model”’, Emirates Occasional Papers, no. 84, July 2014, pp. 1–49; Peter Hellyer, ‘The Evolution of UAE Foreign Policy’, in Ibrahim Al Abed and Peter Hellyer (eds.), United Arab Emirates: A New Perspective, (London: Trident Press, 2001), pp. 161-178.

145. Authors’ interviews with AA, an Emirati subject matter expert, online, 12 October 2021 and X. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022. For an overview of the UAE’s relations with Iran, see Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, ‘Iran-UAE Relations’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam and Gawdat Bahgat (eds.), Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 211-228. For more details on Iran’s active or forward defence strategy, see Hamidreza Azizi, ‘The Concept of “Forward Defence”: How Has the Syrian Crisis Shaped the Evolution of Iran’s Military Strategy?’, The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP), Syria Transition Challenges Project, Research Project Report (4), February 2021, https://dam.gcsp.ch/files/doc/iran-forward-defence-strategy-en; Frederic Wehrey, David E. Thaler, Nora Bensahel, Kim Cragin, Jerrold D. Green, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Nadia Oweidat, and Jennifer Li, Dangerous But Not Omnipotent: Exploring the Reach and Limitations of Iranian Power in the Middle East (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7249/mg781af.

146. Authors’ interview with Z, an Emirati subject matter expert, online, 18 October 2021. For further details on the linkages between religion and nationalism in Iran, see Meir Litvak, ‘”God’s Favoured Nation”: The New Religious Nationalism in Iran’, Religions (Vol. 11, No. 10, 2020), pp. 541-560; Meir Litvak (editor), Constructing Nationalism in Iran: From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic (London: Routledge, 2017); Ali M. Ansari, The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Menahem Merhavy, National Symbols in Modern Iran: Identity, Ethnicity, and Collective Memory (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2019).

147. Authors’ interviews with Y, an Emirati subject matter expert, online, 28 September 2021 and AA. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022. For further details on Iran’s use of non-state actors, see Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); for a historicized view of Iran’s use of non-state actors, see Ariane M. Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National security Strategy (London: Hurst &Co., 2020). For details on Iran’s relationship with the Houthis, see Thomas Juneau, ‘Iran’s Policy towards the Houthis in Yemen: A Limited Return on a Modest Investment’, International Affairs (Vol. 92, No. 3, 2016), pp. 647–63; also see Maysam Behravesh, ‘What Is in Yemen for Iran? A Realist Assessment of Tehran’s Strategic Calculus in the Arabian Peninsula’, in Achim Vogt and Sarah Schmid (eds.), Navigating the Regional Chessboard: Europe’s Options to Address Conflicts in the MENA Region (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, 2020), http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/beirut/17006.pdf.

148. Authors’ interview with Z.

149. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For further details on the limits of Iran’s influence and power, see Michael Wahid Hanna and Dalia Dassa Kaye, ‘The Limits of Iranian Power’, Survival (Vol. 57, No. 5, 2015), pp. 173-198; for details on Iraq, see Shelly Kittleson, ‘Iraqi Voters Want Weaker Militias and a Stronger State’, Foreign Policy, 2 November 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/11/02/iraqi-voters-want-weaker-militias-and-a-stronger-state/.

150. Authors’ interview with AA.

151. Authors’ interviews with X, Y, Z, AA and AB, a US-based subject matter expert, online, 23 November 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For further details on the islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs, see Richard Mobley, ‘The Tunbs and Abu Musa islands: Britain’s perspective’, Middle East Journal (Vol. 57, No. 4, 2003), pp. 627–45; Thomas Mattair, The Three Occupied UAE Islands: the Tunbs and Abu Musa (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2005); Charles L. O. Buderi and Luciana T. Ricart, The Iran–UAE Gulf Islands Dispute: a Journey Through International Law, History and Politics (Leiden and Boston: Brill Nijhoff. 2018). For details on the attack at Fujairah, see Vivian Yee, ‘Claim of Attacks on 4 Oil Vessels Raises Tensions in Middle East’, The New York Times, 13 May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-oil-tanker-sabotage.html. For background on Iran’s missile programme, see Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Program (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42849, 2012), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R42849.pdf; Shahram Chubin, ‘Is Iran a Military Threat?’, Survival (Vol. 56, No. 2, 2014), pp. 65-88; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran%E2%80%99s-rocket-and-missile-forces-and-strategic-options-0.

152. Authors’ interviews with X and AA. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022. For a useful overview of Iran’s commercial ties to the GCC states, see ‘The Gulf states are an economic lifeline for Iran’, The Economist, 17 March 2022, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/03/17/the-gulf-states-are-an-economic-lifeline-for-iran.

153. Authors’ interview with X. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022.

154. Authors’ interviews with Y and Z. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For further details on the missile and drone attacks targeted at the UAE in early 2022, see ‘Timeline: UAE under drone, missile attacks’, Al-Jazeera, 3 February 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/3/timeline-uae-drone-missile-attacks-houthis-yemen; ‘The war in Yemen reaches Abu Dhabi’, The Economist, 29 January 2022, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/01/29/the-war-in-yemen-reaches-abu-dhabi; Sidharth Kaushal, ‘Lessons from the Houthi Missile Attacks on the UAE’, RUSI, 3 February 2022, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/lessons-houthi-missile-attacks-uae.

155. Authors’ interviews with X and AA. For more details on Iranian threats to strike targets in the UAE in retaliation for challenges to its interests by external actors (such as the US), see ‘Iran tells MBZ it will hit UAE in response to a US attack’, Middle East Eye, 30 November 2020, https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/iran-uae-mbz-us-attack-hit-response; ‘Amid Soleimani crisis, Iran threatens to level Dubai and Israel. But why?’, TRT World, 8 January 2020, https://www.trtworld.com/magazine/amid-soleimani-crisis-iran-threatens-to-level-dubai-and-israel-but-why-32793.

156. Authors’ interview with AB. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021.

157. Authors’ interview with AA. For a historical perspective on Iran’s security logic, nuclear programme and its foreign policy drivers, see Ariane M. Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National security Strategy (London: Hurst &Co., 2020).

158. Authors’ interviews with Y and Z. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For a perspective that treats the threat of regional nuclear proliferation with some scepticism, see Gawdat Bahgat, ‘A Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East: Myth or Reality?’, Mediterranean Quarterly (Vol. 22, No. 1, 2011), pp. 27–40; for the opposite view, see Richard L. Russell, ‘Off and Running: The Middle East Nuclear Arms Race’, JFQ: Joint Force Quarterly (Vol. 58, 2010), pp 94–99.

159. Authors’ interviews with Z and AA. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021.
Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022. For further details on the challenges of including the Gulf states in the negotiations, see Shireen Hunter, ‘Involving regional states in Iran talks is a recipe for failure’, Responsible Statecraft, 6 February 2021, https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2021/02/06/involving-regional-states-in-iran-deal-talks-is-a-recipe-for-failure/; Saeid Jafari, ‘Why Iran will not let Arab states join nuclear talks’, Atlantic Council, 25 March 2021, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/why-iran-will-not-let-arab-states-join-nuclear-talks/; Tobias Borck, ‘The Gulf States and the Iran Nuclear Deal: Between a Rock and a Hard Place’, RUSI, 29 November 2021, https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/gulf-states-and-iran-nuclear-deal-between-rock-and-hard-place.

160. Authors’ interviews with X and AA. For more details on the effectiveness of sanctions imposed on Iran and sanctions relief post-JCPOA in 2015, see Kenneth Katzman, Iran Sanctions (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, RS20871, 2022), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf.

161. Authors’ interview with AA. For further details on perceived regional de-escalation, see Anna L. Jacobs, ‘Qatar and Iran Expand Ties Amid Broader Gulf De-escalation’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 11 March 2022, https://agsiw.org/qatar-and-iran-expand-ties-amid-broader-gulf-de-escalation/; for signs that the UAE and Iran are also seeking to reduce tensions, see ‘Iran’s deputy foreign minister pledges “new chapter” in Iran-UAE relations’, Al-Monitor, 24 November 2021, https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2021/11/irans-deputy-foreign-minister-pledges-new-chapter-iran-uae-relations; whether recent de-escalation is part of a sustainable, long-term reduction in regional tensions is yet to be seen, see Galip Dalay and Tarik Yousef, ‘Making Sense of the Middle East’s “Great Reset”’, The National Interest, 9 January 2022, https://nationalinterest.org/feature/making-sense-middle-east%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98great-reset%E2%80%99-199065.

162. Authors’ interview with Y. For more information on engagement between Iran and the UAE, see Sabena Siddiqui, ‘UAE-Iran ties: Engagement across the geopolitical divide’, The New Arab, 13 December 2021, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/analysis/uae-iran-ties-engagement-across-geopolitical-divide.

163. Authors’ interviews with X and Z. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For further details on regional nuclear programmes, see Steven Griffiths, ‘A Review and Assessment of Energy Policy in the Middle East and North Africa’, Energy Policy (Vol. 102, No. C, 2017), pp. 249-269; Jim Krane, Amy Myers Jaffe and Jareer Elass, ‘Nuclear Energy in the Middle East: Chimera or Solution?’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (Vol. 72, No. 1, 2016), pp. 44-51.

164. Authors’ interview with X.

165. Authors’ interview with X. For insight into recent regional dialogue, see Dina Esfandiary and Ali Vaez, ‘Turning Engagement Into a Regional Dialogue Mechanism in the Middle East’, International Crisis Group, 15 June 2021, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/turning-engagement-regional-dialogue-mechanism-middle-east.

166. Authors’ interview with Z.

167. Authors’ interviews with X, Y and AA. For further information on the debate over the relationship between economic interdependence and conflict resolution, see Michiel De Vries, ‘Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analysis’, Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 27, No. 4, 1990), pp. 429-44; Katherine Barbieri, ‘Economic Interdependence: A Path to Peace or a Source of International Conflict?’, Journal of Peace Research (Vol. 33, No. 1, 1996), pp. 29-49; Erik Gartzke, Quan Li and Charles Boehmer, ‘Investing in the Peace: Economic Interdependence and International Conflict’, International Organization (Vol. 55, No. 2, 2001), pp. 391-438.

168. Authors’ interviews with AA and AB. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For details on the UAE’s recalibrated position in Yemen, see Thomas Juneau, ‘The UAE and the War in Yemen: From Surge to Recalibration’, Survival (Vol. 62, No. 4, 2020), pp. 183–208.

169. Authors’ interviews with Y and AA.

170. Authors’ interviews with Y and AA. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 2 November 2021. For signs that the UAE is promoting ‘health diplomacy’, see ‘UAE sends medical aid to Iran in fight against COVID-19’, Arab News, 28 June 2020, https://arab.news/zgbxp.

171. Authors’ interview with X. For further details on commercial links between Iran and the UAE, see Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, ‘How the UAE will Underwrite the Iran Deal’s Success’, Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, 10 February 2022, https://www.bourseandbazaar.com/articles/2022/2/10/how-the-uae-will-underwrite-the-iran-deals-success.

172. Authors’ interviews with AA and AB.

173. Authors’ interviews with Y, AA, AB and Z. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022. For an overview of the role of external powers as security guarantors in the Gulf, see Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, ‘Friends with Benefits: The Gulf States and the Perpetual Quest for Alliances’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation, 2018), pp. 100-117.

174. Authors’ interviews with X, Y, AA and Z. For further details on the UAE’s relations with the US, see Kenneth Katzman, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for US Policy (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, RS21852, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RS/RS21852/138; for a more historical perspective on US involvement in the Gulf, see Joel S. Migdal, Shifting Sands: The United States in the Middle East (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). For background on the military component of the UAE and US relationship, see David B. Roberts, ‘Bucking the Trend: The UAE and the Development of Military Capabilities in the Arab World’, Security Studies (Vol. 29, No. 2, 2020), pp. 301-334; Rajiv Chandrasekaran, ‘In the UAE, the United States has a quiet, potent ally nicknamed “Little Sparta”’, The Washington Post, 9 November 2014, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/in-the-uae-the-united-states-has-a-quiet-potent-ally-nicknamed-little-sparta/2014/11/08/3fc6a50c-643a-11e4-836c-83bc4f26eb67_story.html.

175. Authors’ interviews with X, AA and AB. Najla Al-Qassimi, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 5: The View from the United Arab Emirates’, podcast audio, 24 March 2022. For background on UK-UAE relations, see Saul Kelly and Gareth Stansfield, ‘Britain, the United Arab Emirates and the defence of the Gulf revisited’, International Affairs (Vol. 89, No. 5, 2013), pp. 1203-1219; for a historical perspective, see William Roger Louis, ‘The Withdrawal from the Gulf,’ in William Roger Louis, Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006).

176. Authors’ interview with AB. For further details on China’s role in the region, see Muhamad Olimat, China and the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries: Strategic Partnership in a Changing World (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016).

177. Authors’ interviews with X, Y, AA and AB. For background on relations between the UAE and Israel, see Moran Zaga, ‘Israel and the United Arab Emirates (UAE): Opportunities on Hold’, Mitvim, December 2018, https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/Moran_Zaga_-_Israel-UAE_-_Opportunities_on_Hold_-_December_2018-1.pdf; for a more recent perspective since the Abraham Accords in August 2020, see Ksenia Svetlova, ‘The First Months of Israel-UAE Peace: Israel’s Perspective on the Abraham Accords’, Mitvim, May 2021, https://mitvim.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/The-First-Months-of-Israel-UAE-Peace-Ksenia-Svetlova-May-2021-English.pdf. For details on Israeli prime minister Naftali Bennett’s recent visit to the UAE see, Natasha Turak, ‘Israeli prime minister makes historic UAE visit, stressing ‘new reality’ for region’, CNBC, 13 December 2021, https://www.cnbc.com/2021/12/13/israeli-prime-minister-makes-historic-uae-visit-stressing-new-reality-for-region-.html.

178. Authors’ interviews with AD, a former Iranian government official, online, 5 October 2021 and AE, a UK-based subject matter expert, online, 9 December 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. Nasser Hadian, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 1: The View from Iran’, podcast audio, 27 January 2022, https://www.rusi.org/podcasts/mind-the-gulf/episode-1-view-iran. For an overview of Iran’s relations with its Gulf Arab neighbours, see Dina Esfandiary, ‘No Country for Oversimplifications: Understanding Iran’s Views on the Future of Regional Security Dialogue and Architecture’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 197-214; see also Kenneth Katzman, Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R44017, 2021), https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44017; and see Shireen Hunter, ‘Iran’s Policy Toward the Persian Gulf: Dynamics of Continuity and Change’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam and Gawdat Bahgat (eds.), Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 11-38.

179. Authors’ interview with AF, a US-based subject matter expert, online, 12 November 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For background on the GCC, see Joseph A. Kechichian, ‘The Gulf Cooperation Council: Search for Security.’, Third World Quarterly (Vol. 7, No. 4, 1985), pp. 853–81. For an assessment on political, security and economic cooperation within the GCC, see Jeffrey Martini, Becca Wasser, Dalia Dassa Kaye, Daniel Egel, and Cordaye Ogletree, The Outlook for Arab Gulf Cooperation (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016), https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1429.html.

180. Authors’ interview with AG, a US-based subject matter expert, online, 29 November 2021.

181. Authors’ interview with AF. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For an analysis of arms sales to the Middle East, see Clayton Thomas, Jeremy M. Sharp, Christopher M. Blanchard and Christina L. Arabia, Arms Sales in the Middle East: Trends and Analytical Perspectives for U.S. Policy (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R44984, 2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/R44984.pdf.

182. Authors’ interviews with AE and AJ, a Germany-based subject matter expert, online, 21 January 2022. For further details on Iran’s use of non-state actors, see Ariel I. Ahram, Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011); for a study focused on Iraq’s militias, see Norman Cigar, Iraq’s Shia Warlords and their Militias: Political and Security Challenges and Options (US Army War College Press, 2015); Afshon Ostovar, ‘The Grand Strategy of Militant Clients: Iran’s Way of War’, Security Studies (Vol. 28, No. 1, 2019), pp. 159-188; for a historicized view of Iran’s use of non-state actors, see Ariane M. Tabatabai, No Conquest, No Defeat: Iran’s National security Strategy (London: Hurst &Co., 2020); for an insight into the importance of interpersonal networks to Iran’s strategy, see Joel Beinin and Frederic Vairel, ‘Introduction: The Middle East and North Africa beyond Classical Social Movement Theory’, in Joel Beinin and Frederic Vairel (eds.), Social Movements, Mobilization, and Contestation in the Middle East and North Africa, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013).

183. Authors’ interviews with AG, AE, AJ and AH, a Germany-based subject matter expert, online, 17 December 2021. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For further information on Iran’s ballistic missile programme, see Steven A. Hildreth, Iran’s Ballistic Missile and Space Launch Program (Washington DC: US Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, R42849, 2012), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/R42849.pdf; Shahram Chubin, ‘Is Iran a Military Threat?’, Survival (Vol. 56, No. 2, 2014), pp. 65-88; Anthony H. Cordesman, Iran’s Rocket and Missile Forces and Strategic Options (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2014), https://www.csis.org/analysis/iran%E2%80%99s-rocket-and-missile-forces-and-strategic-options-0. For an analysis of the military balance of power between the Gulf and Iran, see Anthony H. Cordesman and Abdullah Toukan, Iran and the Gulf Military Balance (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016), https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/161004_Iran_Gulf_Military_Balance.pdf.

184. Authors’ interviews with AG and AH.

185. Authors’ interviews with AD, AF, AH and AK, a Europe-based subject matter expert, online, 8 February 2022. Nasser Hadian, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 1: The View from Iran’, podcast audio, 27 January 2022. For an Iranian perspective on Iran’s threat perceptions, see Kamran Taremi, ‘Iranian perspectives on security in the Persian Gulf’, Iranian Studies (Vol. 36, No. 3, 2003), pp. 381-391. For a more up to date view, see J. Matthew McInnis, Iran’s Strategic Thinking: Origins and Evolution (Washington DC: American Enterprise Institute, 2016), https://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Irans-Strategic-Thinking.pdf?x91208; for an overview of US military infrastructure in the Middle East, see ‘U.S. Bases in the Middle East’, American Security Project, 9 February 2021, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/national-security-strategy/u-s-bases-in-the-middle-east/.

186. Authors’ interviews with AH and AK. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For an overview of US-Iran relations, see Michael Axworthy, Revolutionary Iran: A History of the Islamic Republic, 2nd ed. (London: Penguin, 2019).

187. Authors’ interviews with AE, AF, AG and AK. For an analysis of how the Iran-Iraq War, and the ‘War of the Cities’ in particular, fits into Iran’s contemporary security strategy and its missile development programmes, see Erik A. Olson, ‘Iran’s Path Dependent Military Doctrine’, Strategic Studies Quarterly (Vol. 10, No. 2, 2016), pp. 63-93. See also former Iranian foreign minister Javad Zarif’s comments drawing a direct link between Iran’s experiences during the ‘War of the Cities’ and the country’s contemporary missile programme – Javad Zarif, Tweet, 5 March 2018, https://twitter.com/JZarif/status/970737338874781697?s=20&t=4yV4co-vwsd1j8tPpHPy1A. For an overview of how the Iran-Iraq War shaped the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) operational thinking, see Michael Connell, ‘Iranian Operational Decision Making – Case Studies from the Iran-Iraq War’, Center for Naval Analyses, 2013, https://www.cna.org/cna_files/pdf/COP-2013-U-005291-Final.pdf. Also, for a study focused on IRGC narratives and histories that emerged from the war, see Brandon A. Pinkley, Guarding History: The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and the Memory of the Iran-Iraq War, Special Historical Study 12 (Washington DC: Joint History Office, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2018), https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/History/Monographs/Iran_study_complete.pdf.

188. Authors’ interviews with AF and AG. For an overview of Iranian opposition groups, including separatist groups, see Casey Donahue, ‘Profiles: Iranian Opposition Groups’, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 2 July 2020, https://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2020/jul/02/profiles-iranian-opposition-groups.

189. Authors’ interviews with AH, AJ and AK. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For background on cyber cooperation between Israel and Gulf states, see Ahmed El-Masry, ‘The Abraham Accords and their cyber implications: How Iran is unifying the region’s cyberspace’, Middle East Institute, 9 June 2021, https://www.mei.edu/publications/abraham-accords-and-their-cyber-implications-how-iran-unifying-regions-cyberspace.

190. Authors’ interviews with AE, AG, AH and AJ. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For a useful timeline of Iran’s nuclear programme, see Semira N. Nikou, ‘Timeline of Iran’s Nuclear Activities’, The Iran Primer, United States Institute of Peace, 17 August 2021, https://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities. For an in-depth account of Iran’s historical nuclear programme dating back to the 1950s, see Mohammad Homayounvash, Iran and the Nuclear Question: History and Evolutionary Trajectory (Routledge, 2019).

191. Authors’ interviews with AE and AJ.

192. Authors’ interviews with AE and AK. For further details on the links between nuclear weapons and national prestige, see Barry O’Neill, ‘Nuclear Weapons and National Prestige’, Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1560, Yale University, February 2006, https://cowles.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/pub/d15/d1560.pdf.

193. Authors’ interview with AG.

194. Authors’ interview with AD. For the Iranian reaction to the US’ withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018, see Kay Armin Serjoie, ”The Americans Cannot Be Trusted.” How Iran Is Reacting to Trump’s Decision to Quit Nuclear Deal’, Time, 9 May 2018, https://time.com/5270821/iran-nuclear-deal-trump-ayatollah-khameini-hassan-rouhani/.

195. Authors’ interviews with AE and AH. Iran’s fundamental mistrust of the US was, perhaps, one of the factors behind its call for a ‘guarantee’ that a future US administration would not unilaterally withdraw from a renegotiated JCPOA, see Patrick Wintour, ‘US must guarantee it will not leave nuclear deal again, says Iran’, The Guardian, 30 June 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jun/30/us-must-guarantee-it-will-not-leave-nuclear-deal-again-says-iran. Also see Trita Parsi and Bijan Khajehpour, ‘How to Make Iran Trust a New Nuclear Deal’, Foreign Policy, 17 August 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/08/17/iran-nuclear-deal-talks-biden-raisi/.

196. Authors’ interviews with AG and AK.

197. Authors’ interview with AE.

198. Authors’ interviews with AE, AG and AJ. For an analysis on how the Iranian government has sought to establish alternative forms of leverage beyond its nuclear programme, see Mohammad Ayatollahi Tabaar, ‘Iran Won’t Back Down: As Nuclear Talks Resume, Tehran Isn’t Looking to Compromise’, Foreign Affairs, 2 November 2021, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-11-02/iran-wont-back-down; for the possible instability that a new nuclear deal might cause in the region, see Steven A. Cook, ‘A New Iran Deal Means Old Chaos’, Foreign Policy, 17 February 2022, https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/17/iran-deal-jcpoa-israel-saudi-emirates-houthis/.

199. Authors’ interviews with AF and AK. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For possible outcomes if diplomacy was to fail, see Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Alternatives to Failed Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran’, RUSI Newsbrief (Vol. 41, No. 7, 2021), https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/rusi-newsbrief/alternatives-failed-nuclear-diplomacy-iran.

200. Authors’ interview with AJ. For a discussion on the limits of a new deal as a platform on which to build further US-Iran engagement, see Henry Rome, ‘The Limits of a New Iran Nuclear Deal’, Foreign Affairs, 8 March 2022, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2022-03-08/limits-new-iran-nuclear-deal; see also Naysan Rafati, ‘With or Without the JCPOA, Iran Will Be a Challenge for Biden’, International Crisis Group, 10 February 2022, https://www.crisisgroup.org/middle-east-north-africa/gulf-and-arabian-peninsula/iran/or-without-jcpoa-iran-will-be-challenge-biden.

201. Authors’ interviews with AF, AG and AJ. For further information on Iran’s relations with the GCC, see Sanam Vakil, ‘Iran and the GCC: Hedging, Pragmatism and Opportunism’, Chatham House, September 2018, https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2018-09-13-iran-gcc-vakil.pdf.

202. Authors’ interview with AH. Nasser Hadian, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 1: The View from Iran’, podcast audio, 27 January 2022. For examples of Iranian strikes against Gulf-based targets, see Humeyra Pamuk, ‘Exclusive: U.S. probe of Saudi oil attack shows it came from north – report’, Reuters, 19 December 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-saudi-aramco-attacks-iran-exclusive-idUSKBN1YN299; and also Vivian Yee, ‘Claim of Attacks on 4 Oil Vessels Raises Tensions in Middle East’, The New York Times, 13 May 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/13/world/middleeast/saudi-arabia-oil-tanker-sabotage.html.

203. Authors’ interview with AF, AJ and AH. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For signals that Iran is seeking to improve its regional ties, see Iran’s bilateral talks with Saudi Arabia, Raya Jalabi, Aziz El Yaakoubi and Ghaida Ghantous, ‘Saudi confirms first round of talks with new Iranian government’, Reuters, 3 October 2021, https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/saudi-confirms-first-round-talks-with-new-iranian-government-2021-10-03/; also see high-level exchanges between Iran and the UAE, Maziar Motamedi, ‘UAE’s top security official visits Iran to develop ‘warm ties’, Al-Jazeera, 6 December 2021, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/12/6/uaes-top-security-official-visits-iran-to-develop-warm-ties; also see Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi’s visit to Qatar in February 2022, Maziar Motamedi, ‘Iran, Qatar sign major agreements on Raisi’s Doha trip’, Al-Jazeera, 23 February 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/23/irans-president-raisi-says-14-agreements-signed-in-qatar. For a more general overview, see Anna L. Jacobs, ‘Qatar and Iran Expand Ties Amid Broader Gulf De-escalation’, The Arab Gulf States Institute in Washington, 11 March 2022, https://agsiw.org/qatar-and-iran-expand-ties-amid-broader-gulf-de-escalation/.

204. Authors’ interviews with AJ, AG, AH, AF and AK. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. See Iranian efforts to boost trade with Qatar, ‘Qatar-Iran aim to raise trade volume to $1bn’, The Peninsula, 27 February 2022, https://thepeninsulaqatar.com/article/27/02/2022/qatar-iran-aim-to-raise-trade-volume-to-1bn; also see ‘The Gulf states are an economic lifeline for Iran’, The Economist, 17 March 2022, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2022/03/17/the-gulf-states-are-an-economic-lifeline-for-iran.

205. Authors’ interview with AD. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For an analysis on how cooperation over maritime security could provide a basis for closer ties between Iran and the GCC, see David N. Griffiths, ‘Oceans of Opportunity: Maritime Dimensions of Security in the Arab World’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 233-259; also see David N Griffiths, Maritime Aspects of Arms Control and Security Improvement in the Middle East (San Diego: University of California, Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation, 2000), https://escholarship.org/uc/item/1622666f. For a discussion on how joint efforts to improve nuclear safety in the region could lead to greater engagement between Iran and the Gulf states, see Bilal Y. Saab and Nilsu Goren, ‘Atomic Bonds in an Age of Entropy: The Pursuit of a Nuclear Security Framework in the Middle East’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 260-273; also see Selim Can Sazak, ‘Cooperating on Nuclear Power: Regional Management of Energy Initiatives’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 274-301.

206. Authors’ interview with AG. For more details on the resilience of Iran’s non-state networks, see Seth G. Jones, ‘War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East’, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 11 March 2019, https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy.

207. Authors’ interviews with AG, AH and AJ. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022.

208. Authors’ interview with AJ. For further details on the relationship between Iran and Oman, see Marc Valeri, ‘Iran-Oman Relations Since the 1970s: A Mutually Beneficial Modus Vivendi’, in Anoushiravan Ehteshami, Neil Quilliam and Gawdat Bahgat (eds.), Security and Bilateral Issues between Iran and its Arab Neighbours (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017), pp. 149-166. Also see Geraint Hughes’ work on the Dhofar Rebellion (1963-76) in Oman, such as Geraint Hughes, ‘All the Shah’s Men: The Imperial Iranian Brigade Group in the Dhofar War’, Defence-In-Depth, King’s College London, 6 June 2016, https://defenceindepth.co/2016/06/06/all-the-shahs-men-the-imperial-iranian-brigade-group-in-the-dhofar-war/.

209. Authors’ interview with AF. For details on the 2016 attacks on the Saudi Embassy and Consulate in Iran, see ‘UN condemns attack on Saudi embassy in Iran’, BBC News, 5 January 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-35229385; Melissa Chan, ‘Iran Arrests Around 100 People Over Saudi Embassy Attack’, Time, 24 January 2016, https://time.com/4191954/iran-arrests-saudi-embassy-attack/.

210. Authors’ interview with AD. For more details on Iran’s H.O.P.E. initiative and the GCC states’ reactions, see Mehran Haghirian and Luciano Zaccara, ‘Making sense of HOPE: Can Iran’s Hormuz Peace Endeavor succeed?’, Atlantic Council, 3 October 2019, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/making-sense-of-hope-can-irans-hormuz-peace-endeavor-succeed/; see also, Reza Vaisi, ‘Iran, the GCC, and the failure of HOPE’, Middle East Institute, 24 September 2020, https://www.mei.edu/publications/iran-gcc-and-failure-hope.

211. Authors’ interviews with AD, AE, AF and AG. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For an overview of the security and strategic logic that drives Gulf states’ security partnerships and alliances with external powers, see Emile Hokayem and David B. Roberts, ‘Friends with Benefits: The Gulf States and the Perpetual Quest for Alliances’, in Michael Wahid Hanna and Thanassis Cambanis (eds.), Order from Ashes: New Foundations for Security in the Middle East (New York: The Century Foundation Press, 2018), pp. 100-117; for an analysis of how the actions of global powers shape and interact with the foreign policy decisions of regional states, see May Darwich, ‘Great and Regional Powers in the Middle East: The Evolution of Role Conceptions’, Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), October 2018, https://pomeps.org/great-and-regional-powers-in-the-middle-east-the-evolution-of-role-conceptions.

212. Authors’ interviews with AJ, AK, AF and AG. For further details on Iran’s relations with Russia, see Nicole Grajewski, ‘Friends or Frenemies? How Russia and Iran Compete and Cooperate’, Foreign Policy Research Institute, March 2020, https://www.fpri.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/rfp-1-grajewski-final.pdf; also see John Calabrese, ‘True allies? An examination of Sino-Russo-Iranian relations’, Manara Magazine, 23 November 2021, https://manaramagazine.org/2021/11/23/true-allies-an-examination-of-sino-russo-iranian-relations/; Mark N. Katz, ‘Elusive as Ever: The State of Iranian-Russian Cooperation,’ Wilson Center Viewpoints 73, March 2015, https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/elusive_as_ever_state_of_iranian_russian_cooperation.pdf; for Russian-Iranian tensions in Syria, see Samuel Ramani, ‘Russia and Iran in Syria: Military Allies or Competitive Partners?’, LSE Blog, 3 July 2021, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2021/07/03/russia-and-iran-in-syria-military-allies-or-competitive-partners/; for a historicised perspective, see Firuz Kazemzadeh, Russia and Britain in Persia: Imperial Ambitions in Qajar Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 2013).

213. Authors’ interview with AG.

214. Authors’ interview with AG. For further details on how the Caspian Sea fits into the relationship between Russia and Iran, see Nicole Grajewski, ‘Russia and Iran in Greater Eurasia’, Middle East Insights No. 239, 14 July 2020, https://mei.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/Insight-239-Nicole-Grajewski.pdf.

215. Authors’ interviews with AG, AJ and AK. For further details on Iran-China relations, see Scott W. Harold and Alireza Nader, China and Iran: Economic, Political, and Military Relations (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2012), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2012/RAND_OP351.pdf. For a more recent perspective, see Will Green and Taylore Roth, ‘China-Iran Relations: A Limited but Enduring Strategic Partnership’, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 28 June 2021, https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2021-06/China-Iran_Relations.pdf.

216. Authors’ interviews with AD, AF, AH, AJ and AK. Remarks made at a virtual roundtable, RUSI, online, 25 January 2022. For an overview of the tensions between Iran and Israel, see Dalia Dassa Kaye, Alireza Nader and Parisa Roshan, Israel and Iran: A Dangerous Rivalry (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2011).

217. Authors’ interviews with AD and AG. For an overview of the EU’s position after the US withdrawal from JCPOA in 2018, see Beatrix Immenkamp, EU-Iran: The way forward (European Parliamentary Research Service, PE652.001, July 2020), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2020/652001/EPRS_BRI(2020)652001_EN.pdf.

218. Authors’ interviews with AD, AF, AJ and AK. Nasser Hadian, interview with Tobias Borck and Darya Dolzikova, ‘Mind the Gulf: Episode 1: The View from Iran’, podcast audio, 27 January 2022. For an overview of Iran’s recent relations with the UK, see House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, ‘No prosperity without justice: the UK’s relationship with Iran’, HC 415, 16 December 2020, https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/3987/documents/40221/default/.

Research Interviews

A – Bahraini government official. Interview conducted on 21 October 2021.

B – Bahraini SME. Interview conducted on 28 October 2021.

C – Bahraini SME. Interview conducted on 10 February 2022.

D – Kuwaiti SME. Interview conducted on 15 September 2021.

E – Kuwaiti SME. Interview conducted on 27 September 2021.

F – Kuwaiti SME. Interview conducted on 14 October 2021.

G – Kuwaiti government official. Interview conducted on 25 October 2021.

H – Kuwaiti SME. Interview conducted on 12 January 2022.

I – Omani SME. Interview conducted on 9 September 2021.

J – Omani journalist. Interview conducted on 14 September 2021.

K – Oman SME, based in Oman. Interview conducted on 20 October 2021.

M – Qatari SME. Interview conducted on 19 October 2021.

N – Qatari government official. Interview conducted on 25 October 2021.

O – Qatar SME, based in the UK. Interview conducted on 30 November 2021.

P – Qatar SME, based in Qatar. Interview conducted on 27 January 2022.

Q – Saudi government official. Interview conducted on 30 July 2021.

R – Saudi government official. Interview conducted on 21 September 2021.

S – Saudi SME. Interview conducted on 27 September 2021.

T – Saudi SME. Interview conducted on 7 November 2021.

U – Saudi government official. Interview conducted on 20 October 2021.

V – Saudi Arabia SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 8 December 2021.

W – Saudi journalist. Interview conducted on 22 November 2021.

X – Former Emirati government official. Interview conducted on 13 October 2021.

Y – Emirati SME. Interview conducted on 28 September 2021.

Z – Emirati SME. Interview conducted on 18 October 2021.

AA – Emirati SME. Interview conducted on 12 October 2021.

AB – UAE SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 23 November 2021.

AC – Emirati government official. Interview conducted on 4 March 2022.

AD – Former Iranian government official. Interview conducted on 5 October 2021.

AE – Iran SME, based in the UK. Interview conducted on 9 December 2021.

AF – Iran SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 12 November 2021.

AG – Iran SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 29 November 2021.

AH – Iran SME, based in Germany. Interview conducted on 17 December 2021.

AI – Iranian SME. Interview conducted on 20 January 2022.

AJ – Iran SME, based in Germany. Interview conducted on 21 January 2022.

AK – Iran SME, based in Europe. Interview conducted on 8 February 2022.

AM – Gulf SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 4 November 2021.

AN – Gulf SME, based in the UK. Interview conducted on 11 February 2022.

AO – Gulf SME, based in the UK. Interview conducted on 18 November 2021.

AP – Gulf SME, based in the UK. Interview conducted on 12 November 2021.

AQ – Gulf SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 8 December 2021.

AR – Gulf SME, based in the UK. Interview conducted on 1 December 2021.

AS – Gulf SME, based in Qatar. Interview conducted on 27 January 2022.

AT – Gulf SME, based in the US. Interview conducted on 6 December 2021.