Mapping Views Across the Gulf

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Bahraini government sees Iran as aspiring to be the most powerful country in the Gulf region and the wider Middle East. From the Bahraini government’s perspective, Iran’s hegemonic ambitions are a product of its imperial history, combined with the current regime’s expansionist and sectarian ideology. Iran seeks to establish dominance over countries in the Middle East, while pushing external actors (especially the US) out of the region.¹
•  The Bahraini government views Iran as deliberately stoking instability across the Middle East, and regards Iran as the main destabiliser in the region. From the government’s perspective, Iran is pursuing a long-term strategy based on enabling non-state actors and using them to destabilise, undermine and eventually establish control over Arab states; Iran has achieved this in Lebanon and Iraq and is trying to do the same in Bahrain.²
• The Bahraini government thinks that Iran sees itself in a position of strength within the region. In the Bahraini government’s view, Iran has been emboldened by its recent successes when targeting the critical infrastructure of other Gulf states and by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. The perception that Washington wants to be less involved in the Gulf and the Middle East has made Iran even more intransigent and unwilling to compromise on regional security issues.³
• The Bahraini government’s foreign policy, including its view of and relationship with Iran, is substantially influenced by its close alignment with the government of Saudi Arabia and the Kingdom’s policy towards Iran. As it fears abandonment, it defers to Riyadh on many issues related to Iran, but also seeks to push its neighbour into hard-line positions towards Iran.⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Bahraini government considers Iran as the principal threat to its national security and internal stability. It also believes that Bahrain is one of Iran’s primary regional targets for destabilisation. It sees Iran as having played a role in fomenting the 2011 uprising in Bahrain, and as permanently trying to instigate and/or exploit chaos in the country.⁵
• The Bahraini government sees the threat from Iran as multi-dimensional: it includes Iran’s military capabilities, including its drone and missile programmes (short- and long-range); its support for non-state actors, including terrorist groups in Bahrain; and its campaign to undermine societal cohesion in Arab countries – including Bahrain – by radicalising Shia opposition groups and youth.⁶
• The Bahraini government also sees Iran as the main threat to regional security, permanently seeking to undermine regional stability at a time when Bahrain and its neighbours want to focus on economic development.⁷
• The Bahraini government looks to Lebanon – where Bahrain believes that Iran has undermined the state in order to carve out a role for its proxy allies – as a potential playbook that Iran may replicate to destabilise Bahrain. The Bahraini government views Lebanon’s recent history as a warning for what can happen if Iranian influence is allowed to spread unchecked within a country.⁸

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Bahraini government sees the Iranian nuclear programme as a primarily international – not regional – security issue. From its perspective, other Iranian activities are of more immediate concern. (See summary of concerns in the tabs on ‘Perception of Iran’s Position, Objectives and Strategy in the Region’ and ‘Key Perceived Threats Posed by Iran to the Country’.)⁹
• The Bahraini government sees the Iranian nuclear programme and related diplomacy between Iran and the international community as nevertheless having implications for Iranian behaviour in the region. In the Bahraini’s government’s assessment, acquiring advanced nuclear capabilities would embolden Iran and allow it to act more aggressively in the region.¹⁰
• The Bahraini government does not trust Iran’s ability to safely manage its nuclear facilities and fears that an accident, mismanagement, or a natural disaster could lead to an environmental catastrophe in the Gulf.¹¹
• The Bahraini government is concerned about nuclear proliferation in the region and the potential for an advanced nuclear capability in Iran to trigger a regional arms race.¹²

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Bahraini government was not opposed to the 2015 JCPOA on technical terms, but rather on the basis that it did not take regional concerns into account. The Bahraini government worries that international actors – especially the US – are too single-mindedly focused on Iran’s nuclear programme and are willing to overlook Iran’s destabilising regional behaviour in order to secure a diplomatic resolution to the nuclear issue. It believes that the nuclear file must not be de-coupled from regional security issues.¹³
• The Bahraini government sees no prospect of a positive outcome from the current international approach to nuclear diplomacy with Iran; Iranian escalation in the region is possible with or without a renewed nuclear agreement with Iran. The Bahraini government fears that a new nuclear deal will further shift the regional balance of power in favour of Iran and embolden the country. The economic windfall from sanctions relief will allow Iran to invest additional resources in its destabilising activities in the region. On the other hand, failure to limit the Iranian nuclear programme diplomatically may lead to Iran acquiring an advanced nuclear programme. This would also have a destabilising effect on the region (see summary of concerns in the section on ‘Key Concerns and Considerations Regarding the Iranian Nuclear Programme’).¹⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• For the Bahraini government, confidence-building with Iran will only be possible once there is a more equal balance of power between Iran and Arab states. This has less to do with economic or military strength, and more with Iran’s attitude. The Bahraini government feels that Iran does not regard many states in the region – including Bahrain – as equals, but rather as transient accidents of history. Before confidence-building or a regional dialogue is possible, Iran must accept the sovereignty and legitimacy of all states in the region.¹⁵
• The Bahraini government feels that it took a major step in 2010 by declaring that it would not allow its territory to be used for any military operations against Iran. From its perspective, Iran has not reciprocated and has instead continued to try to undermine Bahrain’s national security.¹⁶
• The Bahraini government considers economic engagement with Iran as potentially beneficial to confidence-building in principle, but assesses that such an approach has not worked in the past. It argues that while Iran accepts any concessions it is offered, it does not reciprocate.¹⁷
• The Bahraini government does not want regime change in Iran, as there is concern over what would follow. Instead, it wishes for a stable relationship with Iran, based on mutual respect and non-interference.¹⁸

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Bahraini government does not believe that a sequential approach to resolving issues with Iran can work. From its perspective, once Iran secures concessions on one issue, it will not want to engage on others. Bahrain sees nuclear diplomacy as fitting into this pattern and expects that a new nuclear deal would make Iran less willing to meaningfully engage with its neighbours and compromise on issues of regional concern, such as its missile programme.¹⁹
• The Bahraini government is comfortable with its regional partners – particularly Saudi Arabia – leading on regional diplomacy initiatives with Iran. It trusts that Riyadh will take its interests into account. The Bahraini government is not concerned by the fact that, as of February 2022, it is the only GCC state without substantial bilateral engagement with Iran.²⁰

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• For the Bahraini government, regional security in the Gulf and the wider Middle East requires consistent and reliable engagement from the international community, particularly from the US. From the Bahraini government’s perspective, the Gulf states have little leverage over Iran and instead sees a significant international (and especially Western) military presence in the Gulf as the only way to ensure that Iran does not become – or perceive itself as – the most powerful actor in the region. The permanent presence of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet (headquartered in Bahrain), the UK’s maritime presence in the region (including the British Royal Navy base in Bahrain), and the European Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASOH) mission are positive contributions in this regard.²¹
• There is currently a major trust deficit between GCC states’ governments, including that of Bahrain, and their Western partners. From the Bahraini government’s perspective, the US and Europe lack a clear strategy in the region and GCC states are unsure of US and European commitments to regional security.²²
• The Bahraini government sees Israel as an increasingly important security partner, capable of supplying defence systems and technologies. However, the Bahraini government also fears the prospect of Israeli-Iranian military escalation, as Bahrain may get caught in the cross-fire.²³
• The Bahraini government welcomes the UK’s maritime presence in the region and believes that the UK could be well-positioned to support regional security. While it notes and welcomes the UK’s ambitions to play a more substantial role in the region, it still sees the UK as primarily following US regional policies. The Bahraini government would like to see the UK articulate an independent approach to the region, or more closely coordinate with its European allies on matters of regional security.²⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• From the Kuwaiti government’s perspective, Iran, drawing on its imperial history, considers itself a natural regional power. The Kuwaiti government sees Iran as intent on overturning the prevailing regional order, which Tehran believes is explicitly designed to limit Iranian influence in the region.²⁵
• The Kuwaiti government sees Iran as an expansionist, sectarian and ethno-nationalist power that seeks to present itself as the legitimate guardian of Shia and Persian-heritage populations across the region.²⁶
• The Kuwaiti government views Iran as feeling emboldened by its success at expanding its influence across the region over the past two decades. Iran is always searching for opportunities to further expand its influence by putting pressure on states across the region.²⁷
• The Kuwaiti government sees Iran as relying on non-state proxies to expand its influence across the region but does not believe that Iran is considering any direct territorial invasions of Gulf states. It believes that Iran’s reliance on non-state actors to further its regional agenda and project its influence complicates and undermines efforts at mediating between Iran and other regional states.²⁸
• The Kuwaiti government perceives a power imbalance in the region in Iran’s favour, as well as a contempt on the part of Iran towards the Gulf states (perhaps with the exception of Oman). It concludes that balance can be achieved only with the support of external actors being involved in the region.²⁹
• The Kuwaiti government’s position on Iran is influenced by its relationship with Saudi Arabia. It tends to seek close alignment with Riyadh on matters of regional security, without relinquishing its freedom of manoeuvre, particularly with regard to maintaining a constructive channel of communication with Tehran. Ultimately, the Kuwaiti government’s approach to regional security – and its engagement with its larger neighbours – is the product of its history: recalling Iraq’s attempt to annex the country in 1990/91, Kuwait is weary of the region’s larger powers and their frequent desire to dominate the smaller states.³⁰

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Kuwaiti government’s threat perception is rooted in its geographical location between its three much larger and more powerful neighbours – Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia. At present, instability in Iraq is seen in Kuwait as its most significant national security threat. However, potential expansionist ambitions by its neighbours (including, but not limited to, Iran) are also of concern. This concern is informed by Kuwait’s experience of the Iraqi occupation (1990-91). An escalation in tensions between its neighbours is also worrying for Kuwait.³¹
•  The Kuwaiti government views the direct threat from Iran to its national security to be limited and even regards Iran as a useful counterbalance to Saudi power in the region. Nevertheless, there are indirect national security implications for Kuwait from Iranian activity in the region and regional tensions more broadly, as well as a latent concern that Iran could seek to destabilise Kuwaiti society by influencing Shia or Persian-heritage communities in Kuwait.³²
• The Kuwaiti government is concerned about the impact of Iranian activity or regional conflict on the freedom of navigation in the Gulf and through the Strait of Hormuz. Maintaining shipping routes open, especially for oil exports, is existentially important for Kuwait.
• The Kuwaiti government perceives Iran’s ballistic missile capabilities as the most significant conventional military threat to Kuwait and the Gulf region.³³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Kuwaiti government considers Iran’s behaviour in the region, and the potential of regional conflict involving Iran and another of Kuwait’s neighbours, as a more immediate security concern than the Iranian nuclear programme. In this context, it fears that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons capability could spark regional conflict.³⁴
• The Kuwaiti government is also concerned that an Iran with an advanced nuclear programme would further upset the regional balance of power, potentially leading to a dangerous arms race amongst regional states.³⁵
• The Kuwaiti government is worried about the safety of Iran’s nuclear programme – even if it is entirely civilian in nature. It is particularly concerned about the potential for an accident at the Bushehr nuclear plant, which is geographically much closer to Kuwait City than to Tehran, and the economic, environmental and health implications of such an incident.³⁶

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Kuwaiti government generally supports a nuclear deal with Iran but would ideally like to see more long-term restrictions on the Iranian nuclear programme than those contained in the 2015 JCPOA.³⁷
• The Kuwaiti government’s assessment of the Iranian nuclear programme primarily follows that of the IAEA.³⁸
• The Kuwaiti government is disappointed that both in the diplomatic process leading to the 2015 JCPOA and in the negotiations for a return to the agreement in 2021-22, the negotiating parties have largely excluded regional countries and their security interests.³⁹
• The Kuwaiti government fears that failed nuclear diplomacy could lead to regional conflict or to a regional arms race in which other regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, would also seek to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities. From the Kuwaiti government’s perspective, this would further increase the security dilemma for small regional states such as Kuwait.⁴⁰
• The Kuwaiti government worries that the international community – and especially the US and European countries – could see the conclusion of a nuclear deal with Iran as an excuse to further disengage from the region. From its perspective, a nuclear deal must be accompanied by continued international commitment to regional security.⁴¹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Kuwaiti government considers the differences between Iran and the Gulf monarchies as too fundamental and too ideologically charged to be resolved through basic confidence-building measures. Iran must first give up its claim to having any form of authority over non-Iranian Shia or Persian-heritage communities in the region to facilitate an environment conducive to real dialogue.⁴²
• The Kuwaiti government wants Iran to recognise the agency and independence of each Gulf monarchy. It feels that Iran often considers the smaller Gulf states as mere dependencies of Saudi Arabia and/or the US.⁴³
• The economic and cultural spheres offer some opportunities for cooperation between Iran and Kuwait.⁴⁴
• From the Kuwaiti government’s perspective, Iran could send positive signals that it is prepared to meaningfully engage with the security concerns of the Gulf states by using its influence with the Houthis to push for a viable political solution of the war in Yemen.⁴⁵
• The Kuwaiti government saw Iran’s H.O.P.E. maritime security initiative as a signal that Iran is interested in regional dialogue, although it disagreed with the proposed framework. In general, the Kuwaiti government has little confidence that Iran’s offers of dialogue will be matched with concrete action.⁴⁶

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Kuwaiti government has a strong preference for multilateral approaches to a regional security dialogue with Iran. It fears that the interests of smaller states – including Kuwait’s – could be overlooked or disregarded in bilateral engagements between larger regional powers.⁴⁷
• In its bilateral engagement with Iran, the Kuwaiti government would prefer to take the lead from Saudi Arabia, or at least operate in close coordination with Riyadh.⁴⁸
• The Kuwaiti government is frustrated with the lack of unity within the GCC. From its perspective, only a united GCC can sufficiently protect the interests of smaller member states and be taken seriously by Iran.⁴⁹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Kuwaiti government sees Kuwait and its neighbours as caught in a dilemma. They have become overly dependent on the security guarantees of external powers – chiefly, the US – and have therefore under-invested in their own security capabilities and sustainable regional security arrangements, including within the GCC framework.⁵⁰
• The Kuwaiti government is deeply concerned about the prospect of US disengagement from the region, and a less clear US commitment to Kuwaiti national security, in particular. Washington’s rhetoric about its desire to rebalance towards the Indo-Pacific is a source of great anxiety for Kuwait, which was further exacerbated by the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. A re-affirmation of US commitment to regional security – and potentially even an extension of the US nuclear umbrella over the GCC states – would go some way to alleviating these concerns.⁵¹
• The Kuwaiti government would welcome more European engagement in the Gulf, but senses little appetite for this amongst EU members and it sees a lack of clarity and unity within the EU on security issues in the Middle East. Kuwait sees Europe as an economic giant, but a security dwarf.⁵²
• The Kuwaiti government continues to see the UK as a special partner and there is a high level of trust in the bilateral relationship. However, it is also concerned about the lack of clarity regarding the role the UK wants to play in the region, and it does not presently view the UK as being an independent actor on security matters in the Gulf. Younger generations of Kuwaiti decision makers are particularly sceptical of the UK’s intentions and capabilities.⁵³
• The Kuwaiti government sees China as an increasingly important actor in the Gulf. Beijing is fast becoming the most important economic partner for many states in the region, including for Kuwait. The Kuwaiti government also hopes that China can use its influence in both Tehran and Riyadh to moderate Iranian and Saudi Arabian behaviour and to support (especially maritime) security in the Gulf.⁵⁴
• The Kuwaiti government does not see Israel as a viable security provider in the Gulf or the wider Middle East region.⁵⁵

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Omani government regards Iran as a regional power with legitimate interests, both in the Gulf and the wider Middle East region. It believes that much of Iran’s behaviour in the region can be explained as interest driven. Iran’s activities are a reaction to its interests being threatened or dismissed by other regional and international powers.⁵⁶
• That said, the Omani government sees Iran’s regional behaviour as destabilising and – combined with other countries’ responses to Iranian activities – as creating a climate of insecurity in the Gulf and the wider Middle East. While the Omani government does not see Iran’s activities as posing a direct threat to Oman’s national security, it is concerned about the prospect of regional conflict – potentially sparked by destabilising Iranian behaviour – and the threat that such an escalation would pose to the entire region, including Oman.⁵⁷
• The Omani government considers its bilateral relationship with Iran as friendly and constructive. It still remembers and appreciates Iran’s intervention in support of Sultan Qaboos during the Dhofar War (1963-1976). The Omani government has maintained close relations with Tehran even after the Islamic Revolution. However, there is also a sense in Oman that the bilateral relationship with Iran has become less warm and more transactional in recent years.⁵⁸
• The Omani government sees Iran as a useful counterweight to balance against other regional powers that seek to dominate the Gulf and the wider Arab world – namely, Saudi Arabia and the UAE.⁵⁹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Omani government does not feel directly threatened by Iran, and while it is concerned about the security of the Strait of Hormuz and adjacent shipping lanes, it does not believe that Iran intends to harm Omani interests in the area.⁶⁰
• The Omani government views regional conflict involving Iran as a nightmare scenario and one of the greatest threats to its national security. It is particularly concerned about any disruptions to maritime security in the Strait of Hormuz and the Iranian missile programme.⁶¹
• At present, the war in Yemen is the Omani government’s primary security concern. Besides immediate security implications along Oman’s border, it sees the war as having a negative impact on Oman’s economy, and it is worried about the potential for the war to escalate into a larger regional conflagration.⁶²

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Omani government does not want Iran to attain a nuclear weapons capability. It fears that this would trigger a destabilising regional arms race – including further nuclear proliferation – or could lead to a war in the region.⁶³
• The Omani government is not convinced that Iran wants to acquire nuclear weapons capabilities or that acquiring nuclear weapons would seriously alter Iran’s regional status. The Omani government certainly does not want to risk its constructive relationship with Iran by accusing it of trying to build a nuclear weapon.⁶⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Omani government strongly supported the 2015 JCPOA and facilitated the negotiations between Iran and the US that lead to the agreement. It considers this contribution as a major foreign policy success.⁶⁵
• The Omani government sees nuclear diplomacy – and a renewed nuclear deal – as the only viable option to resolve the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme and prevent it from becoming a source of further regional tension and potential conflict.⁶⁶
• From the Omani government’s perspective, the US withdrawal from the nuclear deal was counterproductive. It supports a mutual return to the JCPOA, but worries that the agreement’s impact may be less substantive than when it was first concluded in 2015 and less likely to restrict the Iranian nuclear programme, grant Iran effective sanctions relief and help build trust between Iran and the international community.⁶⁷

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Omani government is comfortable with its own bilateral relationship with Iran. It feels respected by Iran and is confident in its ability to engage directly with the highest echelons of the Iranian regime, including the Supreme Leader.⁶⁸
• The Omani government sees the lack of mutual trust, and the prevalence of hostile rhetoric between Iran and the other GCC states, as a major obstacle to confidence-building between Iran and the Gulf monarchies. It also recognises that Iran and the GCC states hold diametrically opposing views on the role they wish external actors to play in regional security dynamics. The Omani government is prepared to help facilitate dialogue between Iran and its Arab neighbours but it is also conscious of this approach’s limitations.⁶⁹
• The Omani government believes that progress on resolving the conflict in Yemen is vital to regional security and hopes that it could serve as a foundation for further trust and confidence-building.⁷⁰
• The Omani government sees economic engagement between Iran and the GCC states as a key beneficial outcome of a potential new nuclear deal, and it regards increasing economic interdependence as a promising basis for further regional cooperation. It is particularly hopeful that a project to construct and operate a gas pipeline between Iran and Oman can be revived.⁷¹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• While the Omani government would ultimately like to see a multilateral regional dialogue, it believes that discrete bilateral engagement between Iran and individual Gulf monarchies will be more productive in the short-term. It is prepared to help facilitate such talks and is already hosting meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials on security issues.⁷²
• The Omani government believes that direct engagement between Saudi Arabia and Iran is a necessary condition for improving regional security. It assesses that Saudi Arabia has the most significant concerns with regard to Iran, and that other members of the GCC would ultimately follow Riyadh’s lead if and when it is prepared to enter into a multilateral dialogue with Iran.⁷³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• In principle, the Omani government agrees with Iran that regional security issues are best addressed by regional countries, and it believes that pressure exerted on Iran by external powers is a key driver behind Tehran’s destabilising behaviour in the region. However, the Omani government also recognises that, considering the tense regional environment, security guarantees from external powers provide essential reassurance to many of its fellow GCC members and external powers may continue to be drawn into the region to protect their own interests.⁷⁴
• The Omani government is confident in its own relationship with the US, but it is concerned that uncertainty about Washington’s commitment to regional security is further unsettling other GCC states, making them less open to engaging in dialogue to resolve concerns.⁷⁵
• The Omani government continues to see the UK as its closest European partner, although Sultan Haitham has fewer personal connections to the UK than his predecessor, Sultan Qaboos, and may see less value in the relationship. The Omani government appreciates the UK’s apparent commitment to further expanding the bilateral relationship, as indicated in the UK’s Integrated Review. But it feels that the UK may be more focused on expanding its economic relationship with the UAE and Qatar than prioritising its relationship with Oman. There is also a sense that the UK is unsure of what role it wants to play in the region.⁷⁶
• The Omani government sees China as an increasingly important economic partner – both bilaterally, and for the region. Oman believes that China can play a positive role in maintaining and improving regional security as it has constructive relations with all states in the region.⁷⁷
• While the Omani government has a constructive relationship with Israel, it sees the involvement of Israel in Gulf security as counterproductive as it is likely to further intensify Iranian security fears.⁷⁸

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Qatari government regards Iran as a legitimate regional power, both in the Gulf and in the wider Middle East region, and it also sees Iran as a useful counterweight to Saudi influence in the region.⁷⁹
• The Qatari government understands Iran’s behaviour in the region as driven by a combination of: a desire to (re-)establish itself as a regional leader, and perhaps even as a hegemon; an ideologically fuelled claim to religious leadership in the region; and a strategy to leverage its influence in various Arab states across the region to respond to, and resist, pressure exerted on Iran from other regional or external powers.⁸⁰
• The Qatari government sees Iran as having established a form of escalation dominance in the region. Through its influence in countries like Iraq and Yemen, its network of non-state proxies and its proven missile and drone capabilities, Iran has forced other countries in the region, including the Gulf monarchies, into a reactive position.⁸¹
• The Qatari government pragmatically distinguishes between Iran’s behaviour in the wider Middle East region – especially in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq – which it considers to be deeply destabilising and illegitimate, and its own bilateral relationship with Iran – which is based on an appreciation of Iran’s role as a legitimate major stakeholder in Gulf security which must not be ignored or excluded.⁸²

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Qatari government does not perceive Iran as an immediate threat to Qatar’s national security. It is confident that its bilateral relationship with Tehran is pragmatic and constructive enough to manage disagreements effectively.⁸³
• There is a latent concern amongst some in Qatar that Iran could at some point seek to influence Qatar’s Shia minority, but this does not substantially affect the Qatari government’s security considerations in the short-term.⁸⁴
• While Iran was a useful partner for Qatar during the GCC blockade (2017-21), the Qatari government does not want to jeopardise its relations with its GCC partners by appearing too close to Tehran. As such, it tries to adopt a pragmatic balanced approach to its relationships with Iran, Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states.⁸⁵
• The North Dome/South Pars gas field Qatar shares with Iran is the centre of gravity for Qatar’s national interest and security concerns. Maintaining a constructive relationship with Iran to manage the field is a key priority for the Qatari government.⁸⁶
• Many in Qatar’s small merchant class have personal and familial links to Iran, pointing to a shared cultural and historical space between the two countries. These cultural and historical links further underpin the bilateral relationship.⁸⁷
• The Qatari government sees Iranian influence and activities in other Arab countries – especially in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen – as destabilising and therefore detrimental to regional security, and, consequently, to Qatari interests.⁸⁸
• The Qatari government sees the possibility of a regional conflict involving Iran as a potentially existential threat. It is highly sensitive to the tensions between its two big neighbours Iran and Saudi Arabia, and between Iran and the US, Qatar’s most important security partner. The Qatari government wants to avoid any scenario in which it would be forced to chose sides.⁸⁹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Qatari government does not want Iran to acquire nuclear weapons capability and is opposed to any nuclear proliferation in the region. It does not believe that Iran would use a nuclear weapon against Qatar or other states in the Gulf. But it worries that nuclear weapons capability would further embolden Iran in the region, making it less interested in pragmatic engagement with other states in the region.⁹⁰
• The Qatari government is concerned about the safety of Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly the Bushehr nuclear plant. An accident at Bushehr or at other Iranian facilities (or a military attack on them) could lead to an environmental disaster in the Gulf, with potentially catastrophic consequences for Qatar and its neighbours.⁹¹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Qatari government supports a new nuclear deal with Iran. It sees nuclear diplomacy as the only viable path for resolving the issue of Iran’s nuclear programme; it does not see an acceptable military solution to the issue.⁹²
• If nuclear diplomacy were to fail, the Qatari government could live with a nuclear weapons capable Iran; it would want to avoid a military conflict with Iran at all costs.⁹³
• The Qatari government would have liked to be involved in negotiations with Iran, but it accepts that as long as talks are focused on the nuclear file, there is likely no room for regional countries at the negotiation table. As soon as the focus is widened to other regional security issues, the Qatari government would insist on its involvement and that of the other Gulf states.⁹⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• From the Qatari government’s perspective, Iran’s claim to religious leadership/guardianship over Shia communities across the region is a major obstacle to productive regional dialogue as other countries see these claims as a potentially existential threat. Qatar wants Iran to renounce these claims.⁹⁵
• The Qatari government sees constructive engagement between Iran and the Gulf monarchies as impeded by widely held stereotypes and misconceptions on all sides.⁹⁶
• The Qatari government thinks that economic, societal, and cultural exchanges could eventually lead to improvements in the security sphere, but this would have to be a long-term process.⁹⁷
• As long as US and international sanctions on Iran remain in place, there is little prospect of Qatar expanding its economic engagement with Iran. The Qatari government wishes to portray Qatar as abiding by international law and would want to avoid falling foul of the US.⁹⁸

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Qatari government saw Iran’s H.O.P.E. maritime security initiative as a non-starter as it considers Iran itself to be the main source of insecurity in the waters of the Gulf. It also feels that the proposal did not acknowledge the GCC states as equal partners in the region.⁹⁹
• The Qatari government believes that a new nuclear deal with Iran could serve as a foundation for a wider regional security dialogue, particularly if such dialogue is supported by the US and other external powers.¹⁰⁰
• In principle, the Qatari government supports the idea of a dialogue between the GCC and Iran. It has a strong preference for multilateral engagement as it wants to avoid any scenario in which larger powers make agreements on regional security that fail to take into account Qatar’s interests. However, the Qatari government does not believe that the GCC is currently united enough for such an approach, and therefore sees bilateral engagements between the Gulf monarchies and Iran as more realistic in the short-term. It is also prepared to help facilitate such dialogue between its neighbours.¹⁰¹
• The Qatari government is sceptical about the effectiveness of sanctions on Iran. It believes that attempts to pressure Iran are ineffective in positively influencing Iranian behaviour. Instead, the Qatari government would encourage an approach by the international community that prioritises de-escalation and the use of economic incentives.¹⁰²

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Qatari government believes that, by focusing on the provision of security guarantees and support for a rules-based international order in the region, external powers can help create an environment in which regional countries – regardless of their size – feel empowered to resolve regional security issues. Currently, the Qatari government sees external actors as being reactive in their engagement with the region and lacking a clear strategy for regional security.¹⁰³
• The Qatari government regards its relationships with external powers – especially the US – as fundamental to its national security. It is confident in its bilateral relationship with the US and believes that the US remains committed to the region, despite perceptions among other Gulf states to the contrary; it still considers the US as the indispensable guarantor of security in the region.¹⁰⁴
• The Qatari government welcomes the involvement of other external actors in efforts to support regional security, so long as their engagement is focused on contributing to the security of the region as a whole and not countering the activity of a single country (e.g., Iran).¹⁰⁵
• The Qatari government regards European states like France, Germany, and Italy as important bilateral partners. But it also senses a lack of clarity and unity in European approaches to the region.¹⁰⁶
• The UK is an important partner for Qatar; the UK-Qatar joint fighter squadron is a concrete example of strong bilateral ties between the two countries. However, the Qatari government ultimately sees the UK as playing a secondary and supporting role to the US. While the UK has strong historic links with the Gulf states, it is seen to be lacking a regional strategy and a defined idea of the role it wants to play in the region.¹⁰⁷
• The Qatari government does not currently see Israel as a viable security partner in the Gulf due to Israel’s open opposition to Iran. It does not oppose Gulf-Israel relations but believes that the Abraham Accords can make it more difficult to cooperate with Iran on regional security because Israel’s engagement in the Gulf region has caused Iran to recalculate its threat perception towards the region.¹⁰⁸
• The Qatari government continues to see Turkey as a key regional partner, including with regard to security in the Gulf. It sees Turkey as a useful counterweight to both Iran and Saudi Arabia.¹⁰⁹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• From the Saudi government’s perspective, Iran is pursuing an ideologically fuelled, expansionist and revisionist agenda to undermine and overthrow the established regional order in the Middle East. It sees Iran as showing no regard for the legitimacy and sovereignty of other states in the region. Iran’s modus operandi is to build up armed non-state actors, usually appealing to their Shia (or, to a lesser extent, Persian heritage-based) identities as a source of loyalty to the Islamic Republic, that challenge and dismantle the authority of states from within.¹¹⁰
• The Saudi government sees the Islamic Republic as a revolutionary regime that draws its legitimacy not from delivering for the Iranian people, but from a religious ideology incompatible with the international order of independent states. It also regards the notion that the Iranian regime is divided between so-called hardliners and moderates as an Iranian fiction designed to give it more manoeuvrability.¹¹¹
• The Saudi government understands Iran’s regional strategy as long-term focused. In its assessment, Iran thinks several decades into the future. Iran’s stranglehold over Lebanon, for example, has been 50 years in the making, and Iran approaches its engagement with other countries in a similar way – destabilising countries and securing influence within them over time. The Saudi government is concerned that, if the Houthis – another one of Iran’s allies – are allowed to dominate Yemen, they will become a tool for malign Iranian influence on the Kingdom’s southern border like Hezbollah is for Israel.¹¹²
• In the region, the Saudi government sees Iran as operating form a position of strength. Working with – and through – its armed non-state actor allies, such as Hezbollah, the Houthis and militias in Syria and Iraq, Iran has effectively surrounded the Kingdom. International sanctions may hurt the Iranian economy, but the Saudi government feels that they have failed to curb Iranian expansionism in the region.¹¹³
• The Saudi government sees the Iranian government as vulnerable to opposition by the Iranian population. It believes that the Iranian people aspire to the same socio-economic development that other countries in the region – including the Kingdom – are pursuing. Consequently, the Iranian regime relies on promoting its narrative of an ideologically based mission against external enemies to divert attention from its domestic failures.¹¹⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Saudi government sees Iran as the main source of threats to the Kingdom’s national security, and to the stability and security of the wider region. From its perspective, Iranian missiles, and Iran’s network of armed non-state actor allies directly threaten the physical security of the Kingdom. Furthermore, Iran’s destabilising campaign across the region undermines Saudi Arabia’s socio-economic development agenda, which relies on the Kingdom and the Middle East becoming more integrated into the global economic system.¹¹⁵
• The war in Yemen, and Iran’s support for the Houthis, is the Saudi government’s most important security priority at the moment. The Saudi government fears that the Houthis are in the process of becoming as entrenched in Yemen and Yemeni politics, as Hezbollah is in Lebanon. It acknowledges that Tehran does not entirely control the Houthis, but nevertheless holds Iran responsible for providing the group with political and material support, including missile and drone technology used to target the Kingdom.¹¹⁶
• The Saudi government fears that Iran seeks to destabilise the Kingdom from within by fomenting unrest and sponsoring potential terrorist elements amongst Shia communities in the Eastern Province. It believes that asserting influence over the holy Muslim sites in Saudi Arabia is a long-term objective for the Islamic Republic.¹¹⁷
• The Saudi government sees Iran’s missile programme and drone capabilities as major threats to the Kingdom and the wider region. This also includes the proliferation of weapons and know-how to Iran’s non-state actor partners. The attacks on Saudi oil facilities in Abqaiq and Khurais in September 2019, as well as the continuing cross-border missile strikes on Saudi cities and infrastructure from Yemen, are the most prominent examples of this threat.¹¹⁸
• The Saudi government regards any large-scale military conflict between Iran and Israel and/or the US as a major threat to its national security and interests. Such a conflict would destabilise the entire region, with catastrophic consequences for the Kingdom’s development agenda, and could involve retaliatory Iranian strikes against targets in Saudi Arabia due to its (real and perceived) alignment with Iran’s opponents.¹¹⁹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Saudi government is generally confident that Iran will not use nuclear weapons to attack the Kingdom. It assesses that any attack on the eastern part of the Kingdom would have catastrophic environmental consequences for the whole region, including for Iran, while an attack on the western part of the Arabian Peninsula could destroy holy sites of Islam; neither is in Iran’s interest.¹²⁰
• Nevertheless, the Saudi government believes that a nuclear weapons capability would further shift the regional balance of power in Iran’s favour. It would give Iran outsized prestige on the international stage and provide it with the ultimate deterrent; both would serve to embolden Iran in its campaign to achieve regional hegemony.¹²¹
• The Saudi government believes that an Iranian nuclear weapons capability would likely push other countries in the region – including the Kingdom– to attain nuclear capabilities, triggering a regional arms race.¹²²
• From the Saudi government’s perspective, Iran is already using its nuclear programme to extract concessions from the international community, including on matters of regional security. It believes that while international powers may want to separate the nuclear file from regional security issues, Iran will not do the same.¹²³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Saudi government worries that a renewed nuclear agreement would de-facto legitimise the Islamic Republic, the Iranian nuclear programme, and Iran’s regional behaviour on the international stage. It believes that such legitimacy would likely embolden Iran further and make it less prepared to meaningfully engage with states in the region to resolve security concerns.¹²⁴
• From the Saudi government’s perspective, any nuclear agreement with Iran, if necessary at all, should defer the possibility of Iran attaining nuclear weapons capability as far into the future as possible. It does not believe that the regime in Tehran will change in the near or medium term, and that the international community must therefore permanently constrain it. The Saudi government opposes externally imposed regime change in Iran; it believes that meaningful change can only come from the inside.¹²⁵
• The Saudi government’s ultimate reaction to any nuclear agreement with Iran will depend on US policy and behaviour. It will only support an agreement if Washington remains committed to regional security – and the national security of the Kingdom in particular. The Saudi government fears that Washington will use a renewed nuclear agreement to justify further (perceived) retrenchment from the region.¹²⁶
• Regardless of whether a nuclear agreement with Iran is in place, Iran’s regional behaviour will remain the number one strategic security concern for the Saudi government.¹²⁷

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Saudi government insists that Iran cannot be trusted until it renounces its revolutionary and revisionist ideology. In the meantime, any dialogue and/or cooperative initiatives will be limited in scope.¹²⁸
• The Saudi government wants Iran to demonstrate that it is serious about engaging with other regional countries on an even footing. In its view, the Kingdom and other Arab states have consistently shown their willingness to engage with Iran, including by making their most senior leaders available to meet with Iranian representatives. Iran has not reciprocated; the President and his Ministers may engage, but ultimate power rests with the Supreme Leader.¹²⁹
• In the Saudi government’s view, Iran should demonstrate its commitment to engaging constructively on regional security issues by taking concrete action. Iran must stop its destabilising activity and instead recognise the independence and legitimacy of Arab states (and their governments) across the region.¹³⁰
• The Saudi government would regard Iranian steps towards ending its support for the Houthis in Yemen, and/or pushing the group to engage in meaningful negotiations to end the war and cross-border attacks against Saudi Arabia, as a strong signal that it is serious about improving relations with the Kingdom.¹³¹
• The Saudi government views the stabilisation and eventual economic development of Iraq as an issue that Iran and Saudi Arab could eventually cooperate on. However, this would require Iran to acknowledge Iraq’s status as an independent state (including by accepting the outcome of recent elections).¹³²
• The Saudi government believes that there could be space for cooperation with Iran on non-security issues, including trade, religious tourism (especially related to the Hajj and Umrah), and other cultural exchanges. However, as long as major security concerns remain, any such cooperation can only remain limited.¹³³
• In principle, the Saudi government sees scope for economic cooperation with Iran. However, it is also wary of economic competition with Iran, particularly with regards to oil and gas production. The return of Iranian oil and gas to international markets would inevitably have an impact on prices and the distribution of market share amongst producers in the region and beyond.¹³⁴

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Saudi government is reluctant to give Iran a seat at the table to resolve security issues within and amongst Arab states as this would legitimise Iran’s claim to being a major regional power. At the very least, it wants Iran to acknowledge that it has played a key role in creating many of the crises and conflicts in the region, and recognise all Arab states’ legitimacy, independence and inherent rights to non-interference in their internal affairs. In Yemen, for example, Iran often presents itself as an external actor, rather than as a party to the conflict that must make concessions if it is truly interested in contributing to conflict resolution.¹³⁵
• The Saudi government is open to expanding bilateral dialogue with Iran, regardless of a new nuclear agreement. Ultimately, however, Saudi Arabia believes that real progress on regional security requires a multilateral process involving both regional and extra-regional actors.¹³⁶
• The Saudi government believes that the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation could eventually become a forum for a productive regional dialogue.¹³⁷

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The Saudi government sees the involvement of external powers in Gulf and wider regional security as essential. The reasons for this are twofold: the regional balance of power favours Iran, and the active participation of external actors is required to balance this; and regional insecurity has global implications, and any framework for regional security should therefore include all relevant international parties.¹³⁸
• The Saudi government wants external powers to avoid legitimising or normalising Iran’s regional behaviour. They should be more aware of what Iran is doing in the region and reflect this in their policies and public statements. This should include recognising and treating the non-state actors Iran supports across the region as just as nefarious and threatening to international/regional security as designated terrorist organisations like Daesh and Al-Qaeda.¹³⁹
• The Saudi government continues to see the US as its most important bilateral security partner, and as the most important security provider in the region. But it is also deeply concerned about what it perceives as Washington’s waning commitment to the region. It wants the US to clarify its position and re-affirm its commitment to the region, and especially the Kingdom itself. The Saudi government believes that even if the US is no longer willing to act as the regional hegemon, initiatives to improve regional security can only be sustainable if they are underpinned by clear US security guarantees. This also applies to the sustainability of any nuclear agreement with Iran. Such US support will help correct the power imbalance in the region which the Saudi government currently believes to favour Iran.¹⁴⁰
• The Saudi government sees Europe and the UK as acting as the US’s junior partners in the region. It sees growing gaps between European and UK positions on issues of regional security and believes that this further undermines their credibility as partners in regional security. To play a productive role, Europe and the UK should articulate and demonstrate a clear strategy towards the region, including by setting out how their strategy aligns with and/or differs from that of the US.¹⁴¹
• The Saudi government sees China as an increasingly important partner. For the moment, this partnership is mostly limited to the economic sphere; however, the Saudi government believes that China can eventually make a valuable contribution to regional security, including by using its leverage in Tehran to constrain destabilising Iranian activity.¹⁴²
• From the Saudi government’s perspective, Israel is a key player in regional security. It sees shared objectives with Israel, particularly in relation to Iran, but real collaboration between the two countries still requires progress on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Ultimately, the Saudi government considers Israeli behaviour in the region as unpredictable; this can be an asset as Israeli hawkishness can push Iran to make concessions, but it can also create risks, as an open Israeli-Iranian confrontation would have disastrous consequences for regional security and stability.¹⁴³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The UAE’s component Emirates hold different views of Iran. Abu Dhabi tends to be the most hawkish and focused on Iran as a threat to the UAE’s and wider regional security. Dubai and Fujairah, meanwhile, have long maintained closer relations with Tehran based on trade and commerce. Since the mid-2000s, the UAE’s politics, and its foreign, defence and security policies in particular, have become increasingly dominated by the leaders of Abu Dhabi. Nevertheless, the views of the other Emirates also shape the UAE’s overall approach to Iran.¹⁴⁴
•  The UAE’s federal government regards Iran as an expansionist power with hegemonic ambitions in the Gulf and in the wider Middle East. It also sees Tehran’s accumulation of power and influence in the region as part of Iran’s ‘active defence’ strategy. This strategy aims to keep threats to Iran at arm’s length and away from its borders.¹⁴⁵
• The UAE’s federal government believes that Iran’s behaviour is influenced by its imperial history and Islamist ideology and is characterised by a wilful disregard for the legitimacy and independence of other nation states in the Gulf and the wider Middle East.¹⁴⁶
• From the perspective of the UAE’s federal government, Iran’s behaviour in the region has grown ever-more aggressive over the past two decades, and especially since 2015. It has seen Iran use its non-state allies (in Iraq, Yemen and elsewhere), as well as its conventional military capabilities (including its missile and drone programmes), to encircle the Arabian Peninsula. The Emirati government believes that Iran also seeks access to and influence over the Arabian Sea and the Red Sea and is leveraging its partnership with the Houthis in Yemen’s Shabwah and Hodeida governorates to achieve this.¹⁴⁷
• The UAE’s federal government believes that the international community’s failure to respond firmly to Iran’s destabilising activities in the Middle East has given Tehran the sense that it can act with impunity in the region.¹⁴⁸
• Some in the UAE’s federal government conclude that Iran’s expansionism in the region may have reached its limits or is at least encountering some significant obstacles. There is a clear recognition that Tehran’s control over its non-state actor allies (including the Houthis) is not absolute; and local populations (especially in Iraq) are pushing back against Iranian involvement in their countries.¹⁴⁹
• The UAE’s federal government believes that Iran’s leadership is primarily concerned with regime survival, so will not pursue any regional action that may jeopardise regime stability.¹⁵⁰

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The UAE’s federal government sees Iran as the greatest state-based threat to the Emirates’ national security and that of the other GCC states. This perception is underpinned by Iran’s continued occupation of the Emirati islands of Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs, as well as attacks on ships in Fujairah. The government is particularly concerned about Iran’s missile and drone programmes, as well as its naval activities in the Gulf.¹⁵¹
• However, the Emirati government does not see Iran as a natural enemy and sees advantages in building a more stable relationship with Iran. This position is influenced by Dubai and Fujairah’s closer ties with Tehran. It is underpinned by deep historical and cultural links, as well as increasingly extensive trade and commercial relations.¹⁵²
• The UAE’s federal government is not particularly concerned about Iran’s ability to influence Shia or Persian heritage communities or Iranian nationals living in the UAE. The Emirati federal government do not believe that Iranian influence among the UAE’s various constituencies poses a fundamental national security threat. The Emirati federal government is confident in its domestic political legitimacy and its ability to withstand any attempts at domestic destabilisation.¹⁵³
• The UAE’s federal government considers the proliferation of Iranian missile and drone technology and know-how to Tehran’s non-state actor allies across the region as a growing threat to its national security and to wider regional security. The Houthis’ missile attacks on Abu Dhabi in January and February 2022 highlighted the gravity of this threat.¹⁵⁴
• The UAE’s federal government takes seriously Iranian threats to retaliate against any US or Israeli military attack on Iran by striking at targets in the UAE and other GCC states. It calculates that a missile strike or a terrorist attack killing large number of civilians, including foreigners, could fatally undermine the foundation of the UAE’s development model, which relies on the Emirates’ reputation as a safe place for tourism and business.¹⁵⁵

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• For the UAE’s federal government, the potential threat of Iran acquiring a nuclear bomb is secondary to Iran’s other military capabilities (especially its missile programme) and its network of non-state actor allies. International concerns over the Iranian nuclear programme distract from the other, more immediate threats that Iran poses to the region. The UAE’s federal government does not believe that Iran would use a nuclear weapon in the region.¹⁵⁶
• The UAE’s federal government believes that Iran’s nuclear ambitions are driven by a desire to establish a deterrent against a potential attack from Israel or the US, and to cement its claim to regional hegemony.¹⁵⁷
• The UAE’s federal government fears that Iran acquiring nuclear weapons capability would trigger an arms race and accelerate nuclear proliferation in the region. It believes that other regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and Turkey would also seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance against Iran. From the UAE’s perspective, such an arms race would be particularly detrimental as it would absorb the resources and attention countries in the region need to devote to economic diversification and development.¹⁵⁸

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• In principle, the UAE’s federal government supports a diplomatic agreement that restricts Iran’s nuclear programme, but only if the other parties to the deal – and especially the US – acknowledge that this does not address any of the major concerns of countries in the region and also commit to guaranteeing regional security. Emirati leaders remain concerned that international powers could make concessions to Iran in areas not related to the nuclear file – explicitly or implicitly – in order to incentivise Iran to agree to restrictions on its nuclear programme.¹⁵⁹
• The UAE’s federal government fears that a nuclear deal will give Iran the resources and confidence to further intensify its destabilising activities across the region, especially if international powers do not take a clear stance on these issues.¹⁶⁰
• At the same time, the UAE’s federal government worries that failure to reach a nuclear agreement with Iran could also lead to regional escalation and conflict. Such regional instability would reverse what it sees as positive de-escalatory trends in the region over the previous two years.¹⁶¹
• The UAE’s federal government does not view its bilateral engagement with Iran in the region as connected to the JCPOA; the former would continue even if the latter collapses.¹⁶²
• The UAE’s federal government argues that a nuclear deal that gives Iran the right to enrichment – as the 2015 agreement did – breaks with important regional non-proliferation norms. It often contrasts Iran’s insistence to retain enrichment capabilities with its own decision to develop a nuclear energy programme without indigenous enrichment facilities.¹⁶³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The UAE’s federal government wants Iran to explicitly acknowledge that all states in the region have the right to pursue independent objectives and policy agendas, including by entering into bilateral and multilateral political, economic and security arrangements of their choice.¹⁶⁴
• The UAE’s federal government positively regards Iran’s openness to engage in bilateral dialogues – both with the UAE and with other states in the region. However, to demonstrate its seriousness, Iran needs to follow-up diplomatic engagement with concrete action.¹⁶⁵
• The UAE’s federal government believes that by demonstrating a commitment to economic development, instead of ideologically motivated regional pursuits, Iran could send a positive signal to the region on its desire to support stability and security.¹⁶⁶
• The UAE’s federal government believes that economic engagement and an explicit acknowledgement of the importance to promote economic interdependency and connectivity can build bridges between the two sides of the Gulf – Dubai and Fujairah particularly support this view. At the same time, the UAE’s leadership is also conscious of the fact that economic ties with Iran have not shielded the UAE from attacks by Iran’s non-state actor allies.¹⁶⁷
• The UAE’s federal government wants Iran to demonstrate its seriousness about building better relations with the Gulf states by using its influence with the Houthis and engaging constructively in resolving the war in Yemen.¹⁶⁸
• A greater willingness on the part of Iran to discuss the issue of the three disputed islands in the Gulf (Abu Musa, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb) would also help to improve relations between Iran and the UAE.¹⁶⁹
• The UAE’s federal government believes that there is scope for engagement with Iran on other issues such as pandemic response and vaccines, renewable energy and wider economic cooperation.¹⁷⁰

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• While some in the UAE believe that economic engagement with Iran may help create interdependence that could support an improvement in the regional security situation, others feel that security discussions must precede further economic cooperation. Iran could be an attractive investment destination if its destabilising regional behaviour can be addressed.¹⁷¹
• The UAE’s federal government prefers bilateral engagement with Iran to a more multilateral approach, at least for the moment. It remains sceptical about a joint GCC approach, for example, as this would afford it less control over the process and would likely give Saudi Arabia outsized influence. At the same time, the UAE’s federal government is eager to be kept informed about the content and progress of other bilateral channels, including those between Riyadh and Tehran.¹⁷²

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• The UAE’s federal government regards the diminishing interest of the US to guarantee security in the Gulf as a reality that states in the region will need to adapt to. At the same time, it insists that stability in the Gulf region cannot be divorced from international security and stability and would therefore like to see continued and expanded commitments of international actors to regional security. The UAE’s federal government welcomes and is prepared to cooperate with any international power willing to make a contribution to regional security.¹⁷³
• The UAE’s federal government wants the US to clarify its position in the Gulf and the extent of its commitment to regional security.¹⁷⁴
• The UAE sees European states, especially France, but also the UK, as less powerful, but arguably more reliable, partners than the US, as their foreign policies appear to be less prone to dramatic shifts in response to changes in domestic politics. Nevertheless, it wants European states to clarify their intentions and preparedness to contribute to regional security.¹⁷⁵
• The UAE’s federal government increasingly sees China as the region’s most important economic partner. China may not yet be a security provider, but there is scope for what Emirati leaders perceive as Beijing’s non-ideological and economically oriented approach to the region to contribute to an environment in which Iran and other regional states are willing to prioritise economic engagement over ideological pursuits.¹⁷⁶
• The UAE’s federal government sees Israel as an increasingly important economic and security partner, although it also recognises the sensitivities around Israel’s involvement in regional affairs. The UAE’s federal government is concerned about the level of hostility between Israel and Iran and hopes that by giving Israel a stake in the UAE’s continued security and prosperity it can exercise a moderating influence and reduce the risk of military escalation.¹⁷⁷

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• Iranian leaders do not see the GCC as a monolith; Iran has distinct relations with each state. They regard Saudi Arabia and the UAE as the most powerful, but also most hostile GCC states; Bahrain does not independently feature in their foreign policy thinking and is seen largely as a dependency of Saudi Arabia; they see relations with Oman as friendly and based on trust; and consider ties with Kuwait and Qatar as pragmatic and potentially positive.¹⁷⁸
• Iranian leaders view the GCC as an organisation designed to curb Iranian influence in the region, with many of its members actively lobbying the US and Israel, as well as other international powers, to help contain Iran through economic and military means.¹⁷⁹
• Iranian leaders take issue with the GCC states’ characterisation of the Middle East as a primarily ‘Arab’ region in which Iran – a Persian nation – should not play a significant political role. From their own perspective, Iran’s legitimacy as a regional power is rooted not in ethnicity, but in its long and rich history in the region. In fact, some in Iran argue that the GCC states themselves cannot claim such historical legitimacy.¹⁸⁰
• Iranian leaders see the balance of power in the region as artificially tilted in favour of the GCC states and Israel as a result of the Western-imposed regional order in the Middle East and the US-led campaign to contain the Islamic Republic, including through the provision of military support and equipment to the GCC states.¹⁸¹
• Iran has adopted what Iranian leaders describe as a forward/active defence strategy that relies on addressing threats to Iran’s national security outside of its borders. This is achieved by supporting a network of non-state actors across the region and on protecting and stabilising regions around its borders.¹⁸²
• Iran’s missile programme is another key component of its defence strategy, as a way of balancing against greater conventional military and air power capabilities of other Gulf states.¹⁸³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• Iranian leaders see Iran as the strongest player in regional dynamics – both in terms of its influence and its legitimacy as a regional power.¹⁸⁴
• The GCC states play a secondary role in Iran’s threat perceptions in the region. Iranian leaders see the main threats to Iran’s national security as coming from Israel, the US, and terrorist and other armed non-state groups (e.g., Daesh, Kurdish groups). They see the GCC states as exacerbating some of these threats by hosting US bases, lobbying for US action against Iran, and accepting military support from the US; by collaborating with Israel and, following the conclusion of the Abraham Accords, inviting Israel to play a role in the Gulf region; and by providing material or ideological support to groups like Daesh and separatist movements that are hostile towards Iran and the Iranian regime.¹⁸⁵
• Iranian leaders’ threat perceptions – in the region and globally – are driven by Iran’s relationship with the US. The US is the only existential threat to Iran; the ability of GCC and other regional actors to pose a serious threat to Iran is directly related to the support they receive from the US. US and other Western involvement in the region is therefore provocative and destabilising for regional security and the need to push back US presence and influence in the region is an important driver of Iranian regional policy.¹⁸⁶
• Iranian leaders’ threat perceptions are substantially influenced by the experience of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). They have concluded that the most effective way to protect Iran’s national security is through a strategy of forward defence that both eliminates threats to Iran in neighbouring countries and across the region, while also tying down Iran’s foes outside the Islamic Republic’s borders.¹⁸⁷
• Iranian leaders accuse Saudi Arabia and some of the other GCC states of trying to undermine Iran’s domestic stability by supporting separatists in majority Kurdish, Arab or Baluchi regions of Iran. This is in addition to what they perceive as active Gulf support for Sunni extremist terrorist groups such as Daesh and Al-Qaeda, which includes promoting anti-Shia sectarianism.¹⁸⁸
• Iranian leaders worry that Saudi Arabia and the UAE (and potentially other GCC states) could acquire new military and cyber capabilities – including via their expanding relationships with Israel – that could make them greater threats to Iran’s national security.¹⁸⁹

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• In the 1990s, Iran may have invested in its nuclear programme in response to the Iraqi use of chemical weapons against Iran in the Iran-Iraq War. Today, regional security considerations are not a major driver behind Iran’s nuclear programme. Iranian leaders are confident in Iran’s non-nuclear deterrent capabilities vis-à-vis other states in the region.¹⁹⁰
• Iranian leaders see the expansion of Iran’s nuclear programme first and foremost as leverage in its relations with the US and other international powers.¹⁹¹
• Iranian leaders also regard the nuclear programme as a source of prestige for Iran and a demonstration of its technical capabilities. As such, the programme plays an important role in bolstering Iran’s claim to the status of a regional power (and superiority over other states in the region).¹⁹²
• Iranian leaders also see the nuclear programme as an important component of Iran’s economic development, including as a catalyst for the development of new technologies, to reduce its reliance on fossil fuels for energy generation.¹⁹³

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• Iranian leaders feel that Iran agreed to unprecedented limitations and transparency on its nuclear programme under the JCPOA, while the US and EU failed to meet their obligations, causing the agreement to fall apart.¹⁹⁴
• The experience of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Europe’s inability to sustain the agreement after the US withdrawal, and the slow process of negotiating a return to the terms of the agreement have further convinced Iranian leaders that the West – and the US in particular – cannot be trusted. The experience may well have taken any prospects for substantial economic/political engagement between Iran and the US following a return to the JCPOA off the table.¹⁹⁵
• In contrast to the negotiations that led to the JCPOA in 2015, Iranian leaders now approach nuclear diplomacy with different expectations. The Rouhani administration promoted the narrative that the JCPOA and related sanctions-relief would solve many of Iran’s socio-economic problems; the Raisi government is emphasising that Iran has other options (e.g., economic engagement with regional countries and China).¹⁹⁶
• Nevertheless, JCPOA negotiations remain a way for Iranian leaders to engage with major world powers, as well as a way to divert US resources and attention from other matters, including Iranian activity in the Middle East region.¹⁹⁷
• Iranian leaders see the JCPOA negotiations and the nuclear programme as a source of leverage vis-à-vis the US. As such, once a conclusion is reached on the nuclear issue, Iranian leaders may seek new sources of leverage, for instance by escalating activities in the region.¹⁹⁸
• Iranian leaders are keen to separate the JCPOA negotiations from any discussions about regional security dynamics. Nevertheless, the two may impact on each other. Should diplomacy collapse, Iranian leaders may push for further advances in Iran’s nuclear programme, but they may also seek to stabilise ties with regional countries to limit the economic fallout of new sanctions being imposed. Meanwhile, a new JCPOA could strengthen Iran’s hand in the region, which Iranian leaders could use as leverage in engaging with regional countries.¹⁹⁹
• From the perspective of Iranian leaders, the implications for regional security of a revived or failed JCPOA depend largely on how US policy towards Iran develops following negotiations.²⁰⁰

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• In principle, Iranian leaders seek better relations with the GCC states. In practice, however, they remain concerned that the GCC states’ close relationships with the US (and with Israel) create an asymmetry of power in the region that must be addressed before regional security issues can be resolved.²⁰¹
• Iranian leaders feel that the GCC states are becoming more amenable to engaging directly with Iran. From their perspective, this is the result of the GCC states realising that they cannot rely on the US and that Iran has the ability to inflict costs on them for aligning with US policies, for example through missile and drone strikes.²⁰²
• Iran’s President Ebrahim Raisi sees expanding Iran’s diplomatic and economic relationships in the region as a key priority, superseding the nuclear issue. His administration calculates that expanded regional relationships can help Iran withstand political and economic isolation by Western states or the wider international community, if needed. However, it remains unclear whether the Raisi administration is committed to improving relationships with the GCC states at a strategic level, or whether it would be content with an expansion of tactical and primarily economic engagements.²⁰³
• Iranian leaders see economic opportunities in engaging with the GCC states; some also see increased economic engagement as a starting point for building interdependence and reducing tensions. The lifting of US sanctions as part of a restored JCPOA would make such engagement easier. However, the extent to which economic interdependence could be established and encourage stability should not be overstated; fundamental security issues in Iran’s relationship with the GCC states persist.²⁰⁴
• Iranian leaders may see areas of potential cooperation on the following issues: maritime security in the Gulf, the war in Yemen (though not its relationship with the Houthis), and nuclear safety in the region (with support from the International Atomic Energy Agency).²⁰⁵
• Iranian leaders are highly unlikely to be willing to negotiate on issues related to Iran’s support for the Assad regime in Syria, Hezbollah and other groups in its network of non-state actor allies across the region, and its missile programme. It sees these as key components of its national security strategy. It may be prepared to discuss the roles of its partners in the region, but not the relationships themselves.²⁰⁶

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• Iranian leaders prefer to focus on expanding Iran’s bilateral relations with individual GCC members. This allows them to concentrate on the states they consider strategically most important (i.e., Saudi Arabia), or where they see the most significant economic opportunities (i.e. the UAE and Qatar). Iranian leaders are also confident that the balance of power in all of these bilateral relationships tends to be in Iran’s favour, particularly as the US continues to be more occupied with issues outside of the Middle East region.²⁰⁷
• Iranian leaders are confident in the strength of Iran’s relations with several Arab countries in the region, including Iraq and Syria, but also Oman. It believes that they understand Iranian interests and concerns and may therefore be able to act as intermediaries between Tehran and other governments across the region (though it recognises the limitations of the Syrian government’s current regional cache, in particular). For instance, Iraq’s role in facilitating talks with Saudi Arabia has proven useful.²⁰⁸
• Iranian leaders see restoring full diplomatic relations with the GCC states as an important pre-requisite to further bilateral or multilateral cooperation. (Many GCC states withdrew their diplomatic representations to Iran in 2016 following an attack on the Saudi Embassy in Tehran and Consulate in Mashhad.)²⁰⁹
• Iranian leaders argue that Iran has already made significant contributions towards proposing a new framework for regional security, including the proposal in 2019 of the Hormuz Peace Endeavour (H.O.P.E.) maritime security initiative. They are disappointed that the GCC states have not supported the initiative.²¹⁰

View references

Subject matter experts consulted for this project generally assessed that:

• Iranian leaders insist that regional actors are fully capable of addressing their region’s security issues without involvement of external players. In fact, from their perspective, the involvement of the US and others in regional affairs has only served to destabilise regional dynamics and create greater insecurity. They do not see a role for the US or other powers from outside the region in constructing a future regional security order.²¹¹
• While Iranian leaders also do not desire Russian or Chinese involvement in regional affairs, they do see the potential for Russian and Chinese engagement to provide a balance against US influence in the region.²¹²
• Iran has a complicated historical relationship with Russia and China, making cooperation with them unpopular among the Iranian population. At the same time, both countries are seen as alternatives to Europe when it comes to providing Iranians with economic and educational opportunities.²¹³
• Iranian leaders see Russia primarily as a security partner. There are converging security interests in the Caspian Sea and the Levant, although there are also competitive aspects to the two countries’ engagements in these areas.²¹⁴
• Iranian leaders see great economic opportunities (including trade and technology transfers) in a closer relationship with China. The fact that China seems to be interested in expanding its economic engagement with countries across the region without any obvious ambitions for strategic expansion and influence makes it a relatively unthreatening actor; at the same time, it also makes Beijing less reliable when it comes to defending Iranian interests against other regional countries, or US influence in the region.²¹⁵
• Iranian leaders insist that Israel has no role to play in matters of regional security, especially not in the Gulf. It categorically refuses to recognise and deal with Israel. Maintaining this position is an important component of the Iranian regime’s identity and self-legitimisation.²¹⁶
• In principle, Iranian leaders see European countries and the EU as valuable potential economic partners. However, from their perspective, Europe has lost a lot of credibility by not standing up more firmly to the US when the Trump Administration withdrew from the JCPOA.²¹⁷
• Iranian leaders regard the UK with suspicion, not least because of the complicated historical relationship the UK has had with the region, and with Iran in particular. They do not trust the UK to take a position independent of the US. At the same time, they acknowledge that the UK could play a helpful role in encouraging countries in the region – Saudi Arabia and the UAE in particular – to engage in dialogue with Iran.²¹⁸

View references